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Abstract 
This paper presents series of top income shares in Argentina from 1932 to 2004 
based on personal income tax return statistics. The results suggest that income 
concentration was higher during the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s than it 
is today. The recovery of the economy after the Great Depression, favored by the 
international trade conditions during and after the Second World War, and the 
visible effects of the Peronist policy between 1945 and 1955 generated an 
inverted U shape in the dynamics of top incomes. There is evidence suggesting 
the limits of the Peronist redistributive policy: by 1956 the top income shares 
were still far from the ones observed in the developed world. Since then, and 
after a new upward movement between 1956 and 1959, the top shares seem to 
have described the U-shape pattern found in English-speaking economies.  
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1.Introduction 
 
This paper presents series of top income shares in Argentina between 1932 and 
2004. The use of statistical information from the Argentine personal income tax, 
never exploited before, allows us to cover a long span and fill a gap in the 
analysis of the long run dynamics of income concentration. We find an increase 
in top income shares after the Great Depression, with maxima in 1942-1943, and 
a substantial decline during the Peronist years. However, the limits of the 
Peronist redistributive policy are marked by the fact that in 1956, if lower than in 
1945, the top shares were still far from the ones observed in the developed 
world; they were higher than in the US and much higher than in France, for 
instance. Since then, and after a new upward movement between 1956 and 
1959, top shares seem to have described the U-shape pattern found in the 
developed English-speaking economies. 
 
The evolution of the dynamics of top incomes has attracted much attention lately. 
The book recently edited by Atkinson and Piketty (2007) is an example of this 
interest. The countries studied in the volume are Anglo-Saxon (United Kingdom, 
Ireland, United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia) and continental 
European countries (France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland).1 The 
authors found a drop in income concentration in the first part of the twentieth 
century (mainly between the Great Depression and the end of the Second World 
War) that was essentially the result of a fall in top capital incomes due to 
destruction, inflation, bankruptcies and fiscal policies to finance war debts.2 The 
reason why capital incomes did not recover during the second half of the century 
is still an open question; Piketty (2003) and Piketty and Saez (2006) suggest that 
the introduction of generalized progressive income and estate taxation made 
                                                
1 Atkinson (2005), Atkinson and Leigh (2007 a,b), Dell (2007), Dell et al. (2007), Kopczuk and 
Saez (2004), Nolan (2007), Piketty et al. (2006), Piketty (1998), Piketty and Saez (2003), Saez 
and Veall (2005), Salverda and Atkinson (2007). 
2 The timing and the magnitude of the decline vary across countries. 
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such a reversal impossible.3 The last thirty years tell a different story. The United 
States, Canada and the United Kingdom have displayed a substantial increase in 
top shares driven by large increases in top wages, whereas this phenomenon did 
not happen in continental Europe or Japan. Research has also been done on the 
experiences of Spain, India, Portugal, Japan, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, China 
and Indonesia.4 
 
The case of Argentina is unique and consequently worth studying on several 
grounds. 
 
1. So far, Banerjee and Piketty (2005) on India, Piketty and Qian (2006) on 
China, Leigh and van der Eng (2007) on Indonesia, and this paper on Argentina 
are the only works providing evidence for –currently– developing countries. 
Argentina is the first case to be analyzed in Latin America. 
 
2. Secondly, Argentina was once a relatively rich country that has consistently 
diverged from the industrial economies in the last fifty years; today it is 
indistinguishably a middle income emerging economy. The deterioration of the 
country’s position is one of the puzzling cases in the economics of development. 
 
Between 1880 and 1930, the economy displayed a growth process that changed 
its marginal position in the world and made many think that the country would 
play in South America the role the United States stood for in the north.5 It 
enjoyed its own Belle Époque between 1900 and 1913. The formula of success 
                                                
3 In fact, Switzerland stayed neutral during wars and never implemented very progressive 
personal taxation schemes; top wealth shares were much more stable (see Dell et al. (2006)). 
According to Nolan (2007), Ireland did not experience a significant drop in top income shares 
during the Second World War, them being rather similar in 1920 and 1950; nevertheless, they 
sharply declined in post war decades in parallel with the enforcement of progressive taxation with 
very high top marginal rates. 
4 Alvaredo (2007), Alvaredo and Saez (2006), Banerjee and Piketty (2005), Leigh and van der 
Eng (2007), Moriguchi and Saez (2007), Piketty and Qian (2006). 
5 To make reference to one of the multiple examples of this optimism, both the First Bank of 
Boston and the City of New York Bank (Citibank) opened their two major overseas branches in 
Buenos Aires as early as the 1910s.  
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has been widely analyzed: a relatively literate and skilled population of 
immigrants, a seamless integration of domestic and world economies in trade 
through rail and shipping connections on land and sea financed with foreign 
investment, a large stock of fertile agricultural land, a considerable increase in 
the world demand of raw materials which translated into favorable terms of trade. 
Per capita income rose from 67% of developed-country standards in 1870, to 
90% in 1900 and 100% in 1913. During the fifty years following 1880, GDP grew 
at an average rate of 6% while per capita GDP increased at an annual rate of 
3%, despite total population increased from 3.43 millions to 11.05 millions 
fostered by several immigration waves. Not only was per capita income high, but 
the growth rate was one of the highest in the world.6 In 1913, Argentina’s per 
capita income level ($4,519) was inferior to those of Great Britain ($6,128), the 
United States ($6,308), Canada ($5,290), Australia ($6,800) and New Zealand 
($6,130), but it surpassed the levels of other European economies, such as 
Germany, ($4,341), France ($4,147), Austria ($4,123), Denmark ($4,479), 
Finland ($2,512), Sweden ($3,684), Italy ($3,050) and Spain ($2,682).7 These 
figures place Argentina’s 1913 income level among the world’s top ten. It was not 
a smooth process and the model had its own limitations: high dependency rates, 
the need on external funding, a large but limited land stock. Nevertheless, the 
circumstances helped create an atmosphere of unlimited growth possibilities, 
which was mutually shared by the ruling class, the people and the immigrants. 
 
In contrast, the last fifty years are much more difficult to summarize. Political 
turmoil, institutional instability, macroeconomic volatility, income stagnation, high 
inflation and two hyperinflations dominated the scenario. Cycles of poor 
economic performance and continuous political upheavals were associated with 
the integration and final acceptance of the working classes into the social and 
political system. Between 1956 and 2004, per capita GDP only grew at an annual 
rate of less than 1%; if we consider the figures after the 2001 crisis, the economy 
                                                
6 See Diaz Alejandro (1970). 
7 Comparative data from Maddison (1995) expressed in 2000 US Dollars. 
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has not virtually grown in the last three decades while inequality has constantly 
increased (see Figures 1 and 9). By the end of 2002, in the aftermath of the last 
macroeconomic crisis, the unemployment rate was well above 20%; GDP sunk 
by 20% and poverty skyrocketed, but recovery resumed rapidly, and the 
economy has been growing at annual rates of 9% in the last five years. 
 
3. Thirdly, although this analysis concerns only the very rich, little is known about 
the long run evolution of the distribution of income in Argentina. The first study 
about inequality dates back to the research program jointly conducted by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the 
National Development Council (CONADE) published in 1965. This study tried to 
measure, for the whole economy, the distribution of income in 1953, 1959 and 
1961 using a variety of sources, including national accounts, banking sector 
balance sheets, the 1963 income and expenditure survey and tax statistics.8 It 
was not until 1972 that the national bureau of statistics began conducting 
biannual household surveys. Before 1974, the survey was restricted to Greater 
Buenos Aires and it covered approximately 33% of the population. Since then, 
other urban centers have progressively been incorporated so that today the 
fraction of represented households exceeds 60% (70% of urban population). Yet, 
microdata displaying personal incomes are only available for 1980-1982 and 
1984-2006 with varying degree of detail. As a result, the vast majority of studies 
about inequality and distribution are based on this source, constrained to the 
analysis of the last twenty-five years and not focused on the top of the 
distribution.9 Survey microdata exist for recent years, but they do not offer 
valuable information when targeting the top, as the rich are missing either for 
sampling reasons, low response rates or ex-post elimination of ‘extreme’ values. 
Therefore, this study is also the first on focusing in the upper part of the 
distribution.  
 
                                                
8 The ECLAC-CONADE study has been used to complete the series and check the soundness of 
the results.  
9 Survey data sets for 1972-1973 and 1975-1979 are not available. 
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4. Argentina has traditionally been identified as one of the economies with one of 
the lowest relative inequality in Latin America despite the recurrent 
macroeconomic crisis. It is indeed more egalitarian than Chile, Mexico and 
Brazil.10 A word of caution is in order, though. On the one side, Latin America is 
an area characterized by very high inequality levels when compared to Europe 
and Asia. On the other, during the last fifteen years, the increase in inequality in 
Argentina has outpaced Latin American averages. Finally, the periods of 
negative growth strongly hit the poor.11 Notwithstanding this trend, Argentina’s 
human development index has remained top in Latin America since its 
publication in 1975. 
 
5. Finally, Argentina did not actively participate in the world wars, but it deeply 
suffered the consequences of the Great Depression and of several 
macroeconomic crises.12 At the same time, it never developed a generalized 
progressive taxation system on income and wealth; the number of income tax 
payers has never exceeded 6 % of total adults, this figure being much smaller in 
the case of the wealth tax. No European country satisfies simultaneously these 
two conditions, i.e. exposure to shocks and absence of generalized progressive 
taxation. Consequently, the case of Argentina can provide some light on the 
discussion about the relative importance of war and other shocks vis-à-vis the 
implementation of progressive personal tax schemes on the dynamics on income 
distribution.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology; details are presented in the appendixes. Section 3 focuses on tax 
evasion and elusion issues that affect our results. Section 4 and 5 present the 
main findings. The last section is devoted to conclusions. 
 
                                                
10 See Gasparini (2004) for an account of inequality levels in Latin America. 
11 See Gasparini et al. (2007). 
12 Of course, Argentina was affected by the wars even if it did not participate directly (for 
instance, through capital disaccumulation due to the impossibility to import capital goods during 
the conflict); this is true for almost every western country. 
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Income tax data suffer from serious drawbacks. The definitions of taxable income 
and tax unit tend to change through time according to the tax laws. While there is 
a predisposition to under-reporting certain types of income, taxpayers also 
undertake a variety of avoidance responses, including planning, renaming and 
retiming of activities to legally reduce the tax liability. These elements, which are 
common to all countries, become critical in developing countries. However, 
alternative sources such as household surveys are not free of problems 
regarding under reporting, differential non-responses, unit design and information 
at the top of the distribution. Therefore, even if income tax data must be read with 
caution, especially in the case of developing economies, they can still be 
informative and remain a unique source to study the dynamics of income 
concentration during the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
 
2.Data and methodology 
 
At the start of the interwar period, customs on imports constituted the largest 
fraction of government revenue in Argentina. As public income depended heavily 
on international trade, it was cyclically correlated with trade conditions. The 
consequences of the Great Depression exposed the country to the commodity 
lottery and the worsening of the terms of trade. In order to moderate the adverse 
effects of the crisis on public finances, the government followed a conservative 
fiscal policy and sought orthodox budget balance by replacing the lost customs 
revenues with a dramatic increase in direct taxes on income and wealth, which 
moved from 5% of public revenue in 1920 to more than 23% in 1933. As part of 
this process, the first personal income tax was enforced in 1932 in Argentina as a 
policy response to the negative outcome that the world crisis had on the public 
budget. Appendix A describes the legal evolution of the tax. 
 
Tables 1A displays the composition of tax receipts between 1932 and 2004, 
while Table 1B shows tax collections as percentage of GDP. The growing 
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importance of the personal income tax until 1943 (it moved from 6.04% of state 
revenues in 1932 to 19.33% in 1944) mirrored the decline of international trade-
based taxes (which went down from 40.70% in 1932 to 7.50% in 1945).13 Both 
facts, the creation of the personal income tax in 1932 (initially established as an 
emergency and temporary tax for only two years) and its declining importance 
during the second half of the century, shape the availability of data. 
 
The tabulations of income tax returns published by the Argentine tax 
administration constitute the primary data source for this study. The data cover 
the years 1932 to 1954, 1956, 1959, 1970 to 1973 and 1997 to 2004. 
Unfortunately, the continuity of the publication was lost after 1960, altered by 
increasing macroeconomic volatility, growing inflation and political instability. The 
tables report, by intervals of income, the number of taxpayers, total income 
reported, taxable income, tax paid, exempted income and family deductions. 
 
Taxation laws never allowed joint filing for married couples. Consequently, the 
number of tax units (the number of individuals had everybody been required to 
file) is approximated by the number of persons in the population aged 20 and 
over from the national census. Throughout the paper, ‘tax units’ always refer to 
individuals. Appendix B completes the information about data sources and 
definitions. 
 
Table 2 displays the reference totals for population and income. The number of 
tax filers has always been rather small, ranging from 1.7%-2.0% of tax units in 
1932-1935, 5.1%-5.3% in 1953-1958, 3.3%-4.1% in 1970-1973 and around 5% 
in 1997-1998 (column [4]). While the growing inflation (column [8]) happening 
during the second half of the century could have implied a rise in the obligation to 
file (by reducing the significance of the minimum threshold), minimum non-
taxable income and family deductions were regularly updated so that exemption 
                                                
13 Tables 1A and 1B considers all legislated taxes. It is worth stressing the importance that the 
inflation tax had in the public revenue in Argentina during the second half of the century (see 
Ahumada et al. (2000)). 
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levels remained high. By necessity our analysis focuses on the very top of the 
distribution. 
 
The Pareto extrapolation techniques described in Appendix C, were used to 
compute for each year the average income of the top percentile P99-100, the top 
0.5% P99.5-100, the top 0.1% P99.9-100 and the top 0.01% P99.99-100 of the 
tax unit distribution of total income. We also estimated the income thresholds 
P99, P99.5, P99.9 and P99.99, and the average incomes of the intermediate 
fractiles P99-99.5, P99.5-99.9 and P99.9-99.99. Estimations for the top 5% are 
displayed for 1953, 1954, 1961 and 1997. 
 
Table 3A gives thresholds and average incomes for top fractiles in 2000. There 
were 23,8 million tax units, with an average income of $7,155. Column [2] reports 
the income thresholds corresponding to each of the percentiles in column [1]. For 
example, an annual income of at least $163,468 was required to belong to the 
top 0.1% while the average income above the 0.01% is $1,402,012. Table 3B 
displays the results after adjustments for under-reporting. Table 6 presents the 
top income shares between 1932 and 2004. 
 
 
3.Tax evasion 
 
There is a firm conviction regarding the presence of important levels of tax 
evasion (fraudulent under-reporting or non reporting) and tax elusion (the use of 
legal means to reduce tax liability through planning, renaming or retiming of 
activities) that affect mainly the income and wealth taxes. On the one hand, legal 
responses to taxation cannot be neglected in either the developed or developing 
world. Slemrod (1992, 1995) and Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) have provided 
empirical evidence indicating the significance of avoidance responses to the 
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major US tax changes of the 1980s and 1990s.14 On the other hand, the 
tendency to hide certain types of income to evade taxes is a standard feature in 
developing countries, where a non-trivial fraction of transactions is carried out in 
the informal sector. In this sense how much to tax the rich has always been a 
critical matter, as one would like to limit their incentives both to pursue less 
socially productive activities (Slemrod, 2000) and to carry out business in the 
shadow economy in order to avoid taxes.15 
 
We are particularly concerned about tax evasion in Argentina. Because tax 
evasion means that we cannot observe the data, any quantitative assessment of 
its magnitude might be regarded as speculative. In any case we provide some 
elements for the analysis. 
 
It is more likely that the phenomenon of evasion has been more relevant during 
the second half of the century. This presumption is based on several elements. 
Firstly, the official publications of the tax authority between 1932 and 1950 
describe a rather extensive fiscal control; for instance, in 1939, 29,000 individuals 
were inspected over a total of 144,923 files. This information, if relevant, is 
inconclusive as soon as one accepts that the number of tax files is endogenous 
and that the probability of being audited is the fraction of inspected individuals 
over the total number of potential (and not the observed) tax reporters. 
 
Secondly, existent measures of the size of the underground economy in 
Argentina show that the level of unreported activities increased markedly after 
1950.16 These studies indicate that there is a positive relationship between tax 
burden, state regulations and the incentive to hide transactions. In the first half of 
the century the tax rates (mainly the top marginal rates) were by far lower than 
                                                
14 For an analysis of the legal responses to taxation, from real substitution responses to 
avoidance responses, see Slemrod (2001) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). 
15 In the developing world, the changes in personal income tax rates and corporation income tax 
rates may generate a shifting of income both between the personal tax base and the corporate 
tax base (as described in Gordon and Slemrod, 2000), and between the formal and informal 
sectors of the economy. 
16 See Ahumada et al. (2003).  
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those in European and North American countries, and slightly lower than in 
neighboring countries such as Chile or Brazil. Finally, tax evasion is well 
connected with the environment of macroeconomic volatility and inflation 
distinctive of the post-1950 period. High inflation also provides strong incentives 
to postpone income reporting; even when this behavioral response is not strictly 
evasion, it can erode tax collections at a great extent. 
 
The government seemed worried about the quantitative scope of evasion and 
elusion in the income tax by the end of the decade of 1950. Advice was 
requested from foreign experts (see Surrey and Oldman, 1960, 1961); the 
Central Bank published a first report on the issue in 1962 (Banco Central de la 
República Argentina, 1962). Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there is no 
statistical information about the level of evasion before 1950. 
 
A first comparison can be made between the results for 1953 from income tax 
data and those from a different data source. We have already mentioned that the 
first study about inequality dates back to the research program jointly conducted 
by ECLAC/CONADE published in 1965.17 This study, which included top earners, 
attempted to measure, for the whole economy, the distribution of income in 1953, 
1959 and 1961. It used a variety of sources, including national accounts, banking 
sector balance sheets, the 1963 income and expenditure survey and income tax 
information. In 1953, the top 5% received 24.22% of total income according to 
the tax statistics; the share turns out to be 28.64% according to 
ECLAC/CONADE (see Table 6); this implies a divergence of 4.42%. When we 
look at the income shares for the top 1%, top 0.5%, top 0.1% and top 0.01%, the 
results based on ECLAC/CONADE are higher than those from the tax statistics 
by 1.52%, 1.40%, 0.64% and 0.17%, respectively.18 
 
                                                
17 Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo and Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
(1965). 
18 In 1953, the income shares for the top 5%, top 1%, top 0.5%, top 0.1% and top 0.01% are: (a) 
according to tax statistics, 24.22%, 12.79%, 9.34%, 4.27% and 1.19% respectively; (b) according 
to ECLAC/CONADE, 28.64%, 14.31%, 10.74%, 4.91% and 1.36%, respectively. See Table 6.  
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For 1959, the estimates from tax data can be contrasted not only to 
ECLAC/CONADE but also to official estimations of evasion based on fiscal 
amnesties. During the decades of 1960 and 1970 two official attempts were 
made to measure the degree of income unreporting in the tax. These 
observations show that income hidden from tax files cannot be neglected during 
the second half of the century. 
 
In 1962, a fiscal amnesty invited taxpayers to report income that had been 
hidden between 1956 and 1961.19 The strategy was the following: the individual 
had to make a statement of the actual amount and composition of his net worth 
as of 12/31/1961; the difference between the actual wealth and the wealth 
reported in the tax file for 1961, net of consumption financed with hidden income, 
was considered the capitalization of non-reported income. Using this information, 
the tax bureau estimated the level of evasion by income brackets for 1959. 
Results are shown in Table 4.20 The last column reports the percentage of hidden 
income as a percentage of declared income. Unreporting, with values between 
27% and 40%, described an inverse U pattern, with maxima for the brackets in 
the middle of the scale. This suggests that evasion, if important across all income 
levels, shows a lower impact at the bottom (where income from wage sources 
dominates) and at the top of the tax scale (where inspections from the tax 
administration agency might be more frequent and enforcement through other 
taxes higher).  
 
The results for 1959 (from tax statistics) were adjusted using the information in 
Table 4, by correcting the declared gross income in the tax files with the under-
reporting measure by income brackets mentioned in the previous paragraph. In 
this case we see that the income shares from the tax statistics, after the evasion 
adjustment, are slightly higher than those from ECLAC/CONADE. For instance, 
                                                
19 The fiscal regularization did not compromise income obtained before 1956 because the tax 
could only be levied retroactively up to a period of six years. 
20 Table 4 presents the results as published by the tax bureau (Presidencia de la Nación, 1967); 
no further information is currently available.  
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the percentage of total income accruing to the top 1% is 18.40% and 17.69%, 
respectively.21 
 
A new amnesty followed in 1970, for the tax evaded between 1964 and 1969.22 
Unfortunately, the tax authorities did not publish the results in detail either. Over 
a total of 589 thousand taxpayers, 300 thousand individuals declared 65% of 
unreported income (with respect to reported income). If we assume that those 
who did not make recourse to the fiscal facility had nothing to declare, then the 
average unreported income was 33% (0.65x300/589).23 We up-scaled the 
information for 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1973 by 33%.24 
 
I now turn to the problem of evasion for 1997-2004. In this period, there has been 
no official attempt to quantify the distance that separates true from declared 
income, so the correction is extremely exploratory and given as an 
approximation.25 As it is usually the case, household surveys are of little help 
when focusing on the very rich and do not offer valuable information when trying 
to get an idea of unreported income in tax data.26 The rich are missing from 
surveys either for sampling reasons or because they refuse to cooperate with the 
time-consuming task of completing or answering to a long form. When found, 
they are sometimes intentionally excluded so as to minimize bias problems 
generated by outliers. The practice of eliminating extreme observations, usually 
seen as data contamination, relies in many cases on expert judgment.27  Groves 
                                                
21 In 1959, the income shares for the top 1%, top 0.5%, top 0.1% and top 0.01% are: (a) 
according to tax statistics after the adjustment for evasion, 18.40%, 13.81%, 6.62% and 1.96% 
respectively; (b) according to ECLAC/CONADE, 17.69%, 12.82%, 5.81% and 1.55%, 
respectively. See Table 6. 
22 The amnesty served primarily to close a temporary fiscal imbalance. This time, declaring net 
assets placed in foreign countries was not mandatory (Law 18.529 of 12/31/1969). For a 
theoretical analysis of the efficiency and equity consequences of permanent and non-permanent 
tax amnesties, see Andreoni (1991). 
23 Ministerio de Economía (1973). 
24 This is of course less satisfactory, as we do not have a measure of evasion by level of income.  
25 Recent official efforts to measure tax evasion targeted the sales tax, which is not surprising 
given the importance of this tax in public revenues. See, for instance, Salim and D’Angela (2005, 
2006). 
26 It has already been mentioned that periodic households surveys are only available since 1974. 
27 See Cowell and Feser (1996). 
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and Couper (1998) report that the probability of response is negatively correlated 
with almost all measures of socioeconomic status.28 Székeley and Hilgert (1999) 
have analyzed a large number of Latin American surveys to confirm that the top 
reported incomes generally correspond to the prototype of highly educated 
professionals rather than capital owners. They find that, in sixteen countries, total 
income of the ten richest households in the survey is very similar to the average 
wage of a manager of a medium to large size firm.29  
 
To get a sense of the mismatch, we quantified the gap between top incomes 
from Argentinean household surveys and top incomes from tax tabulations. This 
was by applying the statutory income tax schedule to the actual income of each 
individual in the survey, after deducting exempted income, the main allowances 
and family deductions and selecting those individuals with positive taxable 
income, as they are the ones present in the tax statistics. Appendix B.4 describes 
the procedure in more detail. Table 5 presents the results of the comparison for 
1997. While there were 698 tax files with income above $1,000,000 and 26 tax 
files with above $5,000,000, the survey’s top 160 individuals only have income 
between $500,000 and $1,000,000. 
 
As aggregated income from surveys are usually below the corresponding 
aggregate income from the national accounts, a standard procedure to overcome 
this problem is to adjust surveys using the information from national accounts as 
a first stage and then to get estimates of evasion in the income tax by comparing 
tax tabulations with adjusted surveys. However, a word of caution is necessary 
here. The fact that means of consumption and income from household surveys 
and national accounts differ is not only because the rich might not be present in 
the surveys: the two sources of information are different and they measure 
different concepts. National accounts track money and are more likely to capture 
                                                
28 They also report how, while survey interviewers in poor countries can usually collect data in 
very poor areas, penetrating the gated communities in which many rich people live is often 
impossible. 
29 In ten cases, total income of the richest households in the survey is below the average salary 
of a manager.  
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large transactions, while surveys follow people and are less likely to include large 
transactors. In the developing world, surveys detect almost exclusively wages 
and pensions, self-employment income and public transfers, while capital income 
is largely neglected. Deaton (2005) analyzes the issue in detail and 
acknowledges that extensive prior adjustments of the national accounts mean 
income (or consumption) are required before using them to up scaling survey 
estimates.30 The Canberra Expert Group on Household Income Statistics (2001) 
has also examined the relationships between the definition of income in national 
accounts and the income appropriate for distribution analysis. Here, we used 
aggregated wages, pensions, self-employment income, dividends and rents from 
the national accounts to correct the survey counterparts. This gives a correction 
factor for underreporting in the survey by income source, assumed constant for 
all individuals and for all levels of income. 
 
Once the survey incomes had been adjusted, we applied the tax schedule to the 
survey (as described in Appendix B.4) and kept the individuals with highest 
taxable income so that the number of selected individuals from the survey 
matches the number of the observed tax returns.31 The difference between total 
income reported in the tax files and the total income found from the adjusted 
income in the survey is the measure of hidden income in tax files. We find an 
average of 53% of underreporting in the income tax for 1997-2004. These results 
                                                
30 Deaton (2005) has found that the ratio of survey to national accounts consumption is generally 
higher in the poorest countries and lower in the richest. In general consumption measured from 
surveys frequently grows less rapidly than consumption measured from national accounts. 
Additionally, there exists a negative relationship between the ratio of survey to national accounts 
on the one hand, and the level of per capita GDP on the other. This relationship is steepest 
among the poorest countries, is flatter in the middle-income countries and resumes its downward 
slope among the rich economies. One of the reasons is that consumption is easier to measure in 
surveys than is income in poorer countries where many people are self-employed, while the 
opposite is true in rich countries. Deaton’s remarks are, however, mainly directed at the 
measurement of poverty. For example, the system of national accounts recommends, in 
measuring production for own consumption, that the effort be made only when the amounts 
produced are likely to be quantitatively important in relation to the total supply of goods in the 
country. This rule makes little sense when we are worried about poor households. 
31 The difference between the number of tax files from the tax statistics and the number of 
individuals with positive taxable income from the survey corresponds to the number of total tax 
evaders. In eliminating the individuals with lowest taxable income we are assuming that the lower 
the income the higher the probability of being a total evader.  
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are close to those found in Gasparini (1999) and Cont and Susmel (2006) and 
are not far from the general belief. This procedure implies a constant level of 
evasion across income levels. This is clearly unsatisfactory and should be 
understood as an approximation. Probably the 53% figure is too high, due to the 
different concepts embodied in the national accounts, and should be read as an 
upper bound.32 
 
 
4.The dynamics of top incomes 
 
Figures 2 to 5 and Tables 6 present the main findings. It is not the aim of this 
paper to provide a detailed account of more than seventy years of economic 
history and policy. Nevertheless, to understand the evolution of the top incomes 
shares, some historical landmarks are worth mentioning. 
 
The fifty years between 1880 and 1930 were the golden period of the 
development process of the country. Falling transportation costs and the 
expansion of world trade made it possible for land-abundant countries to benefit 
from their strong comparative advantage in rural activities. Argentina was one of 
the prototypical examples. The economy flourished, based on the exports of raw 
materials, mainly grains and chilled beef, but also wool, wood, and their 
derivatives, and the imports of manufactures from Europe and the United States. 
The wealthy owners of the large estancias of the Pampas built urban palaces in 
Buenos Aires in the image and likeness of those they saw in Europe during their 
long-lasting trips. Many independent observers have extensively commented 
about the extreme wealth of the wealthy Argentineans of the beginning of the 
century.33 
                                                
32 Engel et al. (1997) and Penchman and Okner (1974) suggest other adjustment mechanisms to 
get estimates of evasion by income level. Their implementation is not feasible here given the 
structure of the available data. Another example of ad hoc corrections for tax evasion can be 
found in Ott (2004). 
33 For an account of the social life and customs of the wealthy Argentinean families in the 
beginning of the century, see Ocampo (2005), Luna (1958), Sebrelli (1985), Jauretche (1966). 
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The initial land policy was to play a key role in shaping the dynamics that wealth 
and income concentration would describe during the golden years. It also marked 
a striking difference from the strategy followed by other economies that never 
imposed major obstacles to acquiring land. In the US, the Homestead Act (1862) 
made land free for small-scale farms, while the Dominion Lands Act in Canada 
(1872) pursued similar results.34 On the contrary, while also committed to the 
attraction of immigrants from Europe, the government of Argentina chose to 
dispose of public lands by making grants of large blocs available to individuals 
and private companies. Private agents with control of large land holdings could 
set higher land prices than public authorities. This made it clear that the objective 
was far from creating a class of small and middle proprietors. Adelman (1994) 
argues that the process by which large landholdings might have broken up in 
absence of scale economies may have operated very slowly in Argentina. Once 
the land was in private hands, the development of grazing increased their values 
to levels not affordable by immigrants, given the limited reach of financial 
institutions and the lack of credit. Additionally, the dramatic increase of livestock 
production since the late nineteenth century strengthened the economies of scale 
and helped maintain the large estates. Together with the extension of the railway, 
all factors contributed to a striking increase in land prices so that many fortunes 
were made overnight. 35 
 
Nevertheless, the source of the concentration of wealth has to be sought not only 
in the land ownership structure in the Pampas combined with the favorable and 
successful pattern of international insertion.36 It was also the result of the not-so-
                                                
34 Gates (1968) thoroughly describes US land policy, while Solberg (1987) and Adelman (1994) 
discuss the case of Canada. 
35 See Sokoloff and Zolt (2007) for a discussion on inequality and taxes in the Americas. 
Johnson and Frank (2004) analyze wealth inequality in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro before 
1860. 
36 The occupation of the territory to the south, accomplished in 1880, was financed mainly by 
wealthy families, who eventually came into possession of large estates in the newly incorporated 
areas. For instance, General Roca, in charge of the expedition, received as compensation a 100-
km-long property, which he named “La Larga,” “The Long One”; see Luna (1989). These methods 
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peaceful construction process of the nation. By 1880, the political organization 
and the occupation of the territory had been achieved on the grounds of an 
alliance between the Buenos Aires elite and the provincial oligarchies: the 
Pampas-driven export-oriented economy granted, for the powerful regional 
groups, the protection of specific local products for domestic consumption. Thus, 
a rich sector devoted to the production of sugar cane developed in the northwest, 
a cotton-oriented sector in the northeast and a vine area in the center-west. 
Consequently, all competition against them, either through imports or through 
production in Buenos Aires, was systematically blocked.37  
 
By 1910, per capita income was among the world’s top ten, the country attracted 
immigrants by the millions, and an atmosphere of unlimited growth possibilities 
was mutually shared by the ruling class, the people and the immigrants. The pre 
First World War migration waves responded elastically to the wage gap between 
the country and Europe. At the same time, Argentina was highly dependent on 
external finance. When British lending collapsed between 1914 and 1919, 
investment and capital formation rates declined markedly. 
 
It is likely that before 1930 the share of top incomes was higher than the level of 
1932 (20.85% for the top 1%) and probably even higher than the global 
maximum of 28.84% in 1943. By 1935, top shares were comparable to those 
found for the United States for 1920s (Piketty and Saez, 2003) and higher than 
those in France (Piketty, 2001). 
 
In 1929, the Argentinean elite was suddenly shocked by the Great Depression 
and the dramatic downturn of conditions in the international sphere. The 
democratic government could not cope with the crisis, and was deposed by the 
                                                                                                                                            
of land occupation and distribution were not new: Rosas’ Campaign to the Desert fifty years 
before had followed the same lines. 
37 For detailed studies about the economic development of Argentina in this period, see Diaz 
Alejandro (1970), Cortés Conde and Gallo (1972), Cortés Conde (1970), Della Paolera and 
Taylor (2001), Rappoport, (1980). For a sketch of the evolution of wealth concentration in Buenos 
Aires during the first half of the 19th century, see Johnson and Frank (2004). 
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first coup d’état that ended sixty-eight years of constitutional order. The inability 
of the elite to understand and adapt to the new situation within the constitution, 
the fear of anarchism and socialism and the necessity to regain political control 
shaped the following thirteen years, 1930-1943, known as the Conservative 
Restoration and the Infamous Decade. It was a period of electoral fraud, union 
conflicts and the increasing importance of the army in political affairs. 
 
Great Britain, the principal destination for exports, abandoned free trade 
practices and made preferential agreements with the ex-colonies during the 
Imperial Economic Conference celebrated in Ottawa in 1932 to promote trade 
within the limits of the empire. Argentina was set aside. The rich landowners 
pressured for a rapid accord with London to secure the exports to the UK. The 
result was the Roca-Runciman agreement, signed between the Argentinean vice 
president and the British minister of trade, which guaranteed Argentina a fixed 
share in the British meat market and eliminated tariffs on Argentine cereals. In 
return, Argentina agreed to restrictions with regard to trade and currency 
exchange, and preserved Britain's commercial interests in the country. From the 
macroeconomic point of view, the nature and consequences of this agreement 
and the true impact on the economic performance are still controversial. There 
are those who see the treaty as a sellout to Britain, while others stress that the 
UK, by according privileges not given to any other country outside the empire, 
helped revert the recessionary situation. From the microeconomic side, it was 
undoubtedly a successful mechanism to preserve the elite’s (but also the state) 
sources of revenue. In any case, the Roca-Runcimann agreement remains a 
historical landmark and the dynamics of top incomes reinforces the idea of the 
elite’s favorable situation between 1933 and 1943. 
 
 20 
Recovery began in 1933 after several years of negative growth.38 By 1935, 
output had regained the 1928 level. The results of the current study strikingly 
coincide with the political and economic phase. The positive slope displayed by 
top income shares between 1933 and 1943 is consistent with the marked 
recuperation of the economy after the Great Depression. The top percentile 
increased from 19.09% in 1933 to 28.84% in 1943. The tax office estimated that 
in 1940 the top 3.4% of individuals received 37.9% of income.39 Figure 5 displays 
the top 0.01% income shares in Argentina and the US. Two facts can be noticed. 
Firstly, the magnitudes in Argentina in 1942 (4.64%) are not very far from those 
in the US in 1916 (4.4%). Secondly, the dynamics in Argentina between 1932 
and 1959 seem to reproduce the shape of US top income shares between 1922 
and 1940 but at higher levels, as if the Argentine cycle lagged around 10-13 
years with respect to the US. This reinforces the idea that the pre-1930 figures in 
Argentina could reasonably be much higher than the observed in 1932, in parallel 
with the evolution in the US, where the top 0.01% participation declined from 
4.4% in 1916 to 1.69% in 1921.40 It is also possible that the higher top shares in 
Argentina as compared to the U.S. correspond to lower marginal tax rates. 
 
Consequently, while top shares started a sustained decrease by the beginning of 
the Second World War in the central economies, they kept growing in Argentina 
until 1944, favored by the export demand from Europe. The country was officially 
neutral during most of the war for several reasons. On the one hand, a relevant 
sector of the army showed a clear preference for the Axis. On the other, the 
British interests in Argentina encouraged neutrality, as it ensured the continuation 
of normal trade with Europe and mainly with the UK. Great Britain opposed all 
US proposals of economic sanctions against Argentina, based on the fact that 
Argentina’s neutrality was crucial for ensuring the safe arrival of shipments to UK 
                                                
38 The 1929-1932 crisis was, until 2000, the longest contraction experienced by the economy, 
while the deepest contraction occurred in 1914 as a result of both external and internal problems 
(bad crops, capital outflows and the beginning of the First World War). 
39 Preamble to Decree 18.229 of 12/31/1943. 
40 The results for the US are taken from Piketty and Saez (2003). 
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ports.41 In any case, the elite had been successful again: during the war, 40% of 
the British meat and grain markets were supplied by Argentina (Rapoport, 1980). 
 
The drop in income concentration between 1914 and 1945 in the central 
economies was primary due to the fall in top capital incomes, as capital owners 
incurred severe shocks from destruction of infrastructure, inflation, bankruptcies 
and fiscal policy for financing war debts. For most of the period, the data do not 
include tabulations reporting the composition of income (wages, salaries, 
business income, dividends, rents, etc.) by income brackets. This is unfortunate, 
as economic mechanisms can be very different for the distribution of income from 
labor, capital, business and rents. Figure 6 displays the evolution of the 
components of total reported income. For 1932-1949, this covers the top 1.7%-
2.6% of tax units, as shown in Table 2, column [4]. In Argentina, the shares of 
wages, professional income and capital income remained stable throughout this 
period, while the increase in business income (including agricultural activities), 
which moved from 30% in 1932 to 60% in 1949, was made at the expense of 
rural and urban rents. 
 
Due in part to immigration, but also because of strong economic interests in the 
country, there was a substantial presence of foreign citizens among the top 
income earners. Table 7 shows the distribution of tax filers by country of origin 
between 1932 and 1946. On average, 40%-45% of individuals and reported 
income corresponded to foreigners. We can also get a rough idea of the relative 
distribution across nationalities within the top brackets. In 1932, 2.25% of tax 
filers were French and 1.61% were British, while they both received income 
proportionally higher than their participation in the number of files (3.12 % of 
declared income each). In contrast, Spanish and Italian citizens represented 
28.19% of filers, with 22.38% of declared income. 
 
                                                
41 For a detailed study on the conflict of interests in the triangular relationship between Argentina, 
the UK and the US, see Rapoport (1980). 
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The Peron years (1946-1955) coincide with a clear decline in the share of the top 
percentile, which moved back to 14.31% in 1953.42 Mainly at the expense of rural 
rents and favored by the accumulation of foreign reserves and the advantageous 
terms of trade in the world markets after the Second World War and the War of 
Korea, the Peronist government deepened the industrialization process that had 
begun many years before, fostered by the impossibility of getting necessary 
imports from Europe during the war.43 A deliberate inward-looking policy to 
finance industrialization and social improvements with rural rents was also to 
modify the structure of the wealthy sector.44 Changes may not have been very 
radical. New industrial families appeared, but also the old names, traditionally 
attached to land wealth, diversified to industrial production.  
 
The government embarked upon a large redistributive policy during the three-
year period between 1946 and 1949 and set the grounds for the welfare state 
and the development of the powerful middle class that characterized the country 
by the end of decade of 1960. It is this period that remained in the ‘collective 
memory’ as the clearest expression of the economic policies of Peronism. After 
the frantic expansion of the economy during the first three years (see Figure 1), a 
crisis in the external sector in 1949 forced major changes in the economic policy; 
initially the expansion of the public sector was held back while attempts were 
made to retain the policy of increasing wages. A new crisis took place in 1952 
(negative trade balance, recession and demonetisation). Thereafter, 
redistribution and credit policies became more prudent and incentives were 
introduced to favor the agricultural sector (which would always be the main 
                                                
42 We refer here to the ECLAC/CONADE results, the percentage of total income accruing to the 
top 1% being 12.79% according to tax statistics. 
43 The true situation of Argentina’s economy after 1945 should not be overstated. During the war 
the country was under a US blockade and cut off from continental Europe, while the UK had to 
devote all its resources to the war effort and could afford to sell very little industrial goods to 
Argentina. The trade surplus and the accumulation of foreign reserves achieved during World 
War II were not due to the growth of exports but the result of a low level of exports and an even 
lower level of imports. As a result of the impossibility of purchasing new equipment, large 
amounts of international reserves reflected, then, an aging capital stock. 
44 One important instrument of the peronist policy was the IAPI, Institute for the Promotion of 
Trade, which established a state monopoly on exports. The IAPI system was disbanded as soon 
as Perón was deposed in 1955. 
 23 
export sector and, as such, the main provider of foreign reserves). These factors 
inaugurated a new recovery of the top shares, which seems to have started 
before the end of Perón’s government and became more apparent soon 
afterward. 
 
The development of a progressive personal taxation system played a secondary 
role, the redistribution being achieved by direct public assistance, subsidized 
interest rate in the credit market, price controls, minimum wage policy, and the 
state management of exports.45 Even if income tax rates steadily increased, the 
number of taxpayers was kept low. On the eve of Perón’s presidency, the top 
marginal rate doubled, jumping from 12% to 25% between 1942 and 1943 and to 
27% in 1946 (similar to the levels found in Chile and Brazil). At the time of the 
reform, in 1943, the authorities explicitly recognized that the top marginal rate 
and the tax scale as a whole were among the lowest in the world (see Figure 
7).46 From 1952 to 1954, the highest incomes were affected by a top marginal 
rate of 32%, this rate being 40% at the end of Perón’s rule, in 1955. 
 
Along with many other relevant transformations, social and labor rights were 
enforced, unions gained in power, and the first national pension system was 
organized. The Peronist redistributive policy was successful and visible among 
the working class; this is a widely acknowledged phenomenon. The use of the 
income tax statistics let us numerically assess the magnitude of the losses 
experienced by the richest during the Peronist phase. The top percentile share 
moved down from 27.5% in 1944 to 13.79% in 1954. The most affected seem to 
have been the richest among the rich: the top 0.1% decreased from 11.81% to 
4.87% and the top 0.01% declined from 4.03% to 1.42% in the same period. The 
                                                
45Notwithstanding the secondary role in terms of redistribution, many changes were 
accomplished in the tax policy arena: (i) the organization of a centralized tax agency (the 
Dirección General de Impuestos a los Réditos and the Administración General de Impuestos 
Internos became the Dirección General Impositiva); (ii) the creation of a tax on extraordinary 
profits, aimed to tap the increase in profits after the WWII; (iii) the enforcement of a proportional 
tax on capital gains in 1946 (Impuesto a las Ganancias Eventuales), on revenues exempted from 
the income tax. 
46 Preamble to Decree 18.229 of 12/31/1943. 
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reduction in income concentration was far from trivial. What is also new is the 
evidence showing the limited effect on the upper part of the distribution 
compared to international standards: by 1954 the top percentile shares were still 
higher than those found in the US and much higher than in France. 
 
However, these limits may also have to be reconsidered in the light of the new 
evidence on the dynamics of top incomes for other countries. The immediate 
post Second World War period saw the effects of the commodity price boom in 
the world markets: as a result of this process, in Australia, the percentage of 
income accruing to the top percentiles steadily increased from 1945 to 1950; the 
top 1% share moved up from 8.44% to 14.13% over the same years, with a clear 
spike in 1950, mainly due to the peak wool prices which sheep farmers received 
in that year (see Atkinson and Leigh, 2007). Argentina also benefited from the 
favorable international situation; nevertheless, it seems that the economic policy 
managed to prevent a new upsurge of top incomes. 
 
Even if our data do not allow to go beyond searching for a detailed explanation of 
what was happening below the top 1%, the drop in the top shares that took place 
until the middle of the decade of 1950 coincided with a general improvement in 
terms of income distribution, as indicated by the fact that the participation of 
wages in total income in national accounts increased 8% between 1945 and 
1954 (Altimir and Beccaria (1999)). The ratio of wages in GDP reached a 
historical maximum of 50.8% in 1954, one year before the military coup that 
deposed Perón (see Figure 8). 
 
After 1955, the intrinsic limits of the import-substitution industrialization strategy 
(which began to become apparent by the end of Perón’s period) resulted in a 
sequence of oscillating economic policies with deep social and political 
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implications during the following twenty years.47 It seemed evident that neither 
the pro-industrialization sector nor the agricultural-based exporter sector (whose 
interests did not coincide) was powerful enough to permanently dominate the 
other. Repeated cycles of short expansions and contractions, increasing inflation 
and institutional weakness dominated the period. 
 
The agrarian activities were responsible of generating the surpluses to foster 
industry and finance the imports of inputs and capital goods demanded by the 
expanding manufacturing sector. The exchange rate was usually fixed, to help 
maintain low levels of inflation and high stability of import prices (denominated in 
local currency). At the same time, extensive and deliberate foreign trade 
protection secured the industry from external competition even in the face of the 
appreciation of the exchange rate. As exports were mainly based on food 
products, any devaluation implied a real loss for wage earners. Consequently, a 
fixed exchange rate, with a tendency to appreciation, favored both workers and 
industrialists (protected from external competition) while it acted as a clear 
disincentive to agriculture. The economic tensions translated to the political 
arena. 
 
Under this scheme, any acceleration of the economy led to fewer exports (more 
exportable goods were demanded internally) and more imports of inputs and 
capital goods. Consuming more tradable goods, together with the 
discouragement of agriculture, generated recurrent balance of payment crises 
and output contractions. Sometimes the endogenous limits in this development 
strategy were reinforced by the international conditions (drop in world prices of 
commodities) so that crises also occurred even if the economy was not growing 
rapidly. The way out of the crisis always implied a tightening of fiscal and 
monetary policies together with large devaluations that corrected the distortion in 
prices. This process favored land-based activities again, drastically reduced the 
                                                
47 Between 1955 and 1976 the country underwent three democratic governments (none of them 
completed the constitutional period), one military-controlled civilian government and three military 
regimes. 
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real value of wages, increased exports and let the government regain foreign 
reserves. Then the process could restart.  
 
The “stop-and-go” nature of economic policy, which eventually ended by the 
middle of the 1970s (to inaugurate a decade of stagnation and very high 
inflation), expressed therefore the limits to industrialization.48 It was, 
nevertheless, a period of reasonable income growth (see Figure 1) vis-à-vis the 
poor performance that the economy displayed between 1981 and 1991.49 The 
sudden movements of the nominal exchange rate ultimately led to violent 
redistributions between workers, the manufacturing sector and the export-
oriented agricultural sector.50 
 
For the following twenty years, we only have observations for 1959, 1961 and 
1970-1973.51 It was generally accepted, for this period, that for the Argentine 
economy the trajectory of real wages served to measure the changes in income 
distribution. A comparison of time changes in top shares with labor income 
provides more evidence of this fact.52 Firstly, part of the improvements generated 
during the initial Peronist years were rapidly reversed. The data appear to 
indicate that the worsening in income concentration started in 1953, together with 
a decline in real wages. By 1959, the top 1% shares had regained 17-18%. 
Between 1953 and 1961, only the higher income groups improved their position 
while the lower ones lost ground. It seems that 1959 constituted a turning point of 
considerable importance. That year, a heavy recession led to a fall in real wages, 
whose participation in GDP dropped drastically, as shown in Figure 8. In fact, 
                                                
48 For an analytic approach to the “stop-and-go” model, see Braun and Joy (1967). 
49 For an analysis of the political economy and the economic policy during the period, see Diaz 
Alejandro (1970), Mallon and Sourrouille (1975), Di Tella and Dornbusch (1983), Di Tella and 
Zymelman(1967, 1973). 
50 The determination of the nominal exchange rate began to play a key and privileged role in all 
spheres of the economy. Di Tella (1987) has characterized the styled fact of the policy: a 
“repressed stage,” when key prices were controlled to tame inflation, and a “loosening state” 
when controls collapsed and inflation jumped. 
51 We remind the reader that the top income shares for 1961 are estimated from 
ECLAC/CONADE, and not from tax statistics; they should be compared to the estimates for 1953 
and 1959 from the same source. 
52 See Petrecolla (1977) and Dieguez and Petrecolla (1979). 
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between 1959 and 1965, the share of wages in GDP attained minimum levels not 
experienced before and which would only be experienced again in the mid-
1970s. In 1974, during the third Peronist period, the share of wages in GDP 
reached the second highest value of the century, 48.4%, a level not achieved 
since 1955.53 
 
There was a marked increase in the shares at the top 0.1% and top 0.01% when 
1973 and 2004 are compared. However, we cannot disentangle what happened 
in the meantime. Between 1953 and 2004, the share of the top 0.01% has 
doubled. As it is not possible fill the gap between 1973 and 1997 with a 
continuous series coming from income tax tabulations, we would like to read our 
results in perspective of the distribution based on household surveys. As 
mentioned before, the area of the Greater Buenos Aires is the only one that has 
been regularly covered by a survey since 1972. It has served as basis for 
multiple studies on inequality and, due to the geographical distribution of the 
population (highly concentrated in Buenos Aires) it has reflected well the 
dynamics of income distribution in the whole country.54 Figure 9 depicts the 
evolution of the Gini coefficient between 1980 and 2004. Available statistical 
evidence shows a relative stability during the decade of 1960 and the first half of 
the decade of 1970, when per capita GDP growth exceeded 3% per year.55 On 
the contrary, between 1975 and 1980 income inequality experienced a sharp 
raise, and the trend of growing inequality continued until the maximum in 1989 
(hyperinflationary crisis). In terms of growth, the 1980s were the ‘lost decade.’ 
 
With a half-century of inflationary experience, the country reached the highest 
inflation rates in the 1980s together with two hyperinflationary episodes in 1989 
and 1990. In 1991, Argentina put its money supply under a dollar exchange 
                                                
53 In recent years, an increasing share of wages in aggregated income per se has ceased to be 
an indicator of diminishing income concentration, since the rise of top shares in English-speaking 
economies has been the result of sharp increases in top wages. 
54 See Gasparini et al. (2001), Gasparini et al. (2004), Lugo (2006), Altimir (1986), Altimir and 
Beccaria (1999), González Rozada and Menéndez (2006). 
55 See Altimir and Beccaria (1999). 
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standard, adopting a fixed exchange rate between the local currency and the US 
dollar, and restricting the issue of money by the Central Bank. This rigorous 
monetary policy, together with a series of structural reforms (mass privatization of 
public services, trade openness, attempts to create a domestic capital market) 
started a decade of price stability and rapid growth until 1998-1999. This policy 
was not neutral in terms of income distribution. Growth and stabilization only 
implied a temporary and mild improvement in inequality after 1990, and by 1995 
the Gini coefficient was 10% higher than in 1985. Overall inequality steadily grew 
in the last years, together with unemployment and poverty levels. The 
macroeconomic crisis of 2001-2002 pushed those indicators to unprecedented 
levels. 
 
Tables 8A and 8B show the top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1% income shares based 
on household surveys. Results in table 8B use the income reported by the 
individual without adjustments while table 8A is based on adjusted incomes as 
described in the end of section 3. Top 1% shares have remained more or less 
stable around 18%-22%. These values are, of course, similar to those found from 
the tax tabulations (Table 6) adjusted for underreporting. The figures should be 
read with caution, though; the limited number of observations in the survey 
introduces large sample variability when focusing on the very top. 
 
The factors behind the constant increase in inequality during the last two 
decades have been broadly analyzed and they include both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic explanations. Firstly, unemployment rates skyrocketed in the 
decade of 1990, and have remained very high since then. Figure 10 displays the 
unemployment rate together with the top 0.01% income share. Although there is 
a widespread belief that changes in labor market participation have been one of 
the main causes of the strong increase in inequality, Gasparini et al. (2004) 
suggest that these ideas should be scaled down. Even if the unemployment rate 
has jumped since 1992, the employment rate did not change much, so that there 
was a minor change in the number of individuals without earnings. Changes in 
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the hours of work seem to have had more significant unequalizing effects, while 
the effect of unemployment translated into more inequality through the fall in the 
relative wages of the poorest. Secondly, changes in the returns to education and 
experience, the transformation of the educational structure of the population and 
the fall in work hours among the low-income groups have all had important roles. 
Also relevant, an observed decrease in the wage gap between genders, a 
potential force for reducing inequality, has not induced any important change. 
Thirdly, the two dramatic crises of 1989 and 2002 cannot be neglected. As a 
result, inequality has been rising during positive growth years, and increasing 
even more during recessions. 
 
Table 9 presents the composition of income by top groups between 2001 and 
2004. Income is divided into rents (urban and rural), capital income, business 
income and wages. Between 1997 and 2004, top incomes again show an 
increasing trend with a drop in 2001 mainly due the reduction of capital and 
business income after the 2001-2002 crash. However, with the rapid recovery of 
the economy since 2003, the top shares have soon regained the pre-crisis levels 
and the top fractiles within the top 1% seem to be the most favored by the 
process. While top 1% passed from 18.03% in 1997 to 23.47 in 2003, the top 
0.01% share almost doubled, going from 2.10% to 4.09%. Here again, all sectors 
connected with exports have seen their relative income increase as long as the 
nominal exchange rate tripled during the crisis but the inflation rate between 
2000 and 2004 remained below 50%. 
 
 
6.Final Remarks 
 
This paper has attempted to analyze the evolution of top shares from a long-run 
perspective and to fill the gap in the analysis of the dynamics of income 
concentration in Argentina since 1932. So far, the only available source of 
information about distributive issues came from observations for 1953, 1959, 
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1961, and from the population surveys started in 1972. Until 1974 the survey was 
restricted to the Greater Buenos Aires area. Other urban centers have 
progressively been incorporated, so that today the fraction of represented 
individuals exceeds 70% of the urban population (60% of total population). Yet, 
microdata showing personal income with some detail are only available for 1980-
1982 and 1984-2006. Despite the existence of survey data for recent years, they 
do not offer valuable information as the rich are missing either for sampling 
reasons, low response rates or ex-post elimination of ‘extreme’ values. 
Therefore, this study is the first in covering such a long span of years and in 
focusing on the upper part of the distribution. Since income tax statistics are the 
primary data source, the analysis has had to be restricted to the top 1%. 
 
From the quantitative point of view, even if the number of well-off individuals may 
be regarded as very small when considering the whole economy, they cannot be 
neglected. If an infinitesimal (in term of members) richest group owns a finite 
share S of total income, then the Gini coefficient turns out to be close to G ≈ S + 
(1-S) G*, where G* is the Gini for the rest of the population. Let’s assume that 
G*=0.30; then a rise of 5% in the top share (as the one experienced by the top 
0.1% in Argentina between 1933 and 1943) translates into a rise of 0.035 in the 
Gini of the whole population.56 This means that when the participation of the rich 
in total income is important, changes in their income shares turn out to be 
potentially relevant in explaining changes in overall distribution.  
  
Top income shares are very volatile in the short run. This is more remarkable 
when compared with the experience of other countries. The magnitude of large 
short-run jumps happened in the central economies only under the exceptional 
circumstances of the World Wars, the 1929 crash or the world prices booms. In 
Argentina, the external shocks and the swings of economic policy (with large 
                                                
56 We borrow this explanation from Atkinson (2007). The percentage of total income accruing to 
the top 0.1% moved up from 7.55% in 1933 to 12.91% in 1943. For a hypothetical and fixed 
G*=0.30, then G increases more than 10%, from 0.352 to 0.390. For a G*=0.40, then G rises from 
0.445 to 0.477. 
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corrections of relative prices and mainly of the exchange rate) are at the roots of 
violent functional and personal redistribution, both of income and of wealth. 
 
The current results suggest that income concentration was higher during the 
1930s and first half of the 1940s than it is today. The recovery of the economy 
after the Great Depression and the visible effects of the Peronist policy between 
1945 and 1955 generated an inverted U shape in the dynamics of top shares, 
with a new decrease during the first half of the decade of 1970. Quite 
interestingly, the levels of concentration in 1953 were very similar to those found 
in 1997, although they reflect two very different moments in history. The first 
belongs to a period when the economy was on a path of improvement of social 
conditions and inequality, while the general belief that dominates the second is of 
a clear regression in these areas. 
 
It is worth noticing that even when we consider the evolution of the top shares 
without any adjustments for under-reporting, a clear increase is observed 
between the mid 1970s and the end of the 1990s, for the top fractiles within the 
top 1%. 
 
A final comment on evasion. It is clearly true that income under-reporting implies 
that our estimates may not measure the level of income shares correctly. 
However, it is hard to argue that the levels of evasion have displayed enormous 
variability to so as to change the description of the time evolution of top shares. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. The Income Tax 
 
At the start of the interwar period import customs constituted a large share 
of government revenues, as is typical in developing countries. The Great 
Depression forced fundamental changes both in the economic policy and in the 
successful model of international insertion Argentina had displayed between 
1880 and 1930. As tax collection was cyclically correlated with trade conditions 
(mainly through taxes on imports), the world crisis exposed the country to the 
commodity lottery and the worsening terms of trade. By December 1929, the 
current account imbalance was severe and the exchange rate was left to float 
after a two-year resumption of the gold standard. High public expenditures in 
1928-1930 were drastically reduced between 1931-1933. The government 
followed a conservative fiscal policy and sought orthodox budget balance by 
replacing the lost customs revenues with a dramatic increase in direct taxes on 
income and wealth, which moved from 5% of public income in 1920 to 15% in 
1933. 
In this context, the first personal income tax (Impuesto de Emergencia a 
los Réditos) was established in 1932 (Law 1/19/1932) during the presidency of 
José E. Uriburu, who had deposed President Yrigoyen two years before in the 
first military coup d’état against the constitutional order started in 1862.57 
Taxed income was classified in four categories. The first category referred 
to rents and income obtained from agricultural and other rural activities when 
performed by the owner of the land. Total revenue from this source could not be 
lower than 5% of the cadastral value established for local taxes. The second 
category included royalties, fixed claim assets, dividends, annuities and 
subsidies. The third category corresponded to professional and business income 
and rural business income from rented land. The fourth category represented 
dependent labor income (wages, salaries and pensions).58 
Exemptions included income derived from patents, copyrights and other 
intellectual property, profit from cooperative societies, severance payments, local 
and federal treasury bonds interest, low-interest saving accounts (this exemption 
extended later to all saving accounts and time deposits) and dividends. The tax 
structure was rather rudimentary: there was a flat rate for income in the first three 
categories, and a three-bracket progressive scale for wages, salaries and 
pensions.  
                                                
57 Several attempts to create a personal income tax between 1916 and 1930 (in 1917,1920, 
1922, 1924, and 1928) were systematically blocked in the senate, dominated by the Conservative 
party. For a detailed account on the political reasons for the failure of any fiscal reform concerning 
the income tax before 1932, see Sánchez Román (2007). Cf. the case of Spain (Alvaredo and 
Saez (2006)) where the first personal income tax was enforced during the Second Republic. 
58 Throughout the years the classification of income in the four categories is a key element as 
each category is affected by different deductions. 
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Tax filing was strictly individual, but income coming from elements under 
joint tenancy was allocated to the husband. 
While the exemption on local and national treasury bonds interest was 
eliminated in 1942 (law 12.808), the first major reform was accomplished 
between 1943 and 1946 in order to increase tax revenues (Decree 18.299 of 
12/31/1943). The tax scale was radically modified, maintaining the existing rates 
on the lowest incomes and increasing them at the top. The top marginal rate 
tripled, jumping from 7% to 22%. It should be noted that this rate was similar to 
those in force, at the time, in Chile (27%) and Brazil (21.4%) but considerably 
lower than those in US, Canada, UK and France. Classification of income 
suffered some changes: professional income was transferred from the third to the 
fourth category while rural business income –from owned and rented land- was 
completely included in the third category (decree 14.338 of 5/20/1946).59 
While the growing inflation started by the second half of the century could 
have implied a rise in the number of taxpayers (by reducing the significance of 
the minimum threshold), non-taxable income and family deductions were 
regularly updated. As only those with positive taxable income were obliged to file, 
the percentage of tax filers with respect to total tax units remained low (see table 
2, column [2]). At the same time, the brackets in the tax scale remained stable, 
whereas the rates were increased again in 1955 (Law 14.393 of 12/31/1954) as 
shown in table 2, column [7]. 
In 1962 the government offered the possibility of regularizing the fiscal 
situation and reporting all income that had been hidden by taxpayers between 
1956 and 1961.60 The strategy was the following: the individual made a formal 
statement of the “actual” amount and composition of his net wealth by 
12/31/1961; he also had to approximate the consumption afforded with hidden 
income during the previous six years. The difference between the actual wealth 
and the wealth reported in the tax file for 1961 was considered as the 
capitalization of non-reported income. Using this information, the tax bureau 
estimated the level of tax evasion by income brackets in 1959. Results are 
shown in Table 4. 
The same strategy was followed in 1970 for the tax evaded between 1964 
and 1969. This time and quite surprisingly, reporting net assets placed in a 
foreign country was not mandatory (Law 18.529 of 12/31/1969). Unfortunately 
the tax authorities did not publish the estimation of the level of tax evasion in 
detail. Over a total of 589 thousand taxpayers, 300 thousand individuals declared 
65% of unreported income. 
Tax scale was revised again in 1969 (law 18.527 of 12/31/1969), when 
marginal rates ranged from 12% to 46%, and in 1974, establishing a scale going 
from 7% to 46% (Law 20.628 of 12/27/1973, which abolished the old Impuesto 
                                                
59 Among the regulations that introduced important changes in the income tax regulation, the 
reader may refer to: Law 1/19/1932 (creation of the income tax); law 11.586 of 7/2/1932 (ordering 
of the tax); law 11.757 of 10/11/1933 (on the exemption of local and national treasury bonds); law 
11.682 of 1/2/1933 and decree 112.578 of 5/4/1938 (classification of income and redefinition of 
the progressive tax scale); decree 18.299 of 12/31/1943 (change in tax scale); decree 14.338 of 
5/20/1946 (re-classification of income). 
60 Decree 6.480 (1962). 
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sobre los Réditos Personales and created a new Impuesto a las Ganancias de 
las Personas Físicas y de las Sucesiones Indivisas). The maximum tax rate 
moved down to 45% in 1985 (Law 23.260 of 9/25/1985) 
By 1997, the top marginal rate had been reduced to 33% and increased to 
35% again in 2000 (Decree 450 of 3/31/1986; Decree 2352 of 12/18/1986; 
Decree 649/97 of 8/6/1997; Law 25.239 of 12/31/1999). 
 
B. References on data sources for Argentina 
 
B.1. Tax Statistics 
Statistical information covering the income tax for years 1932-1950 has 
been regularly published between 1935 and 1950: Dirección General de 
Impuestos a los Réditos, Memoria 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 
1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946; Dirección General Impositiva, Memoria 1947, 
1948, 1949, 1950. Tables display the distribution of taxpayers by brackets of 
income together with net income, taxable income, family deductions, minimum 
exempted income and tax paid. 
The continuity of the publication was lost between 1950 and 1997. The 
Tabulations for 1951-1954, and 1956 were published in Dirección General 
Impositiva, Boletín 1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962 (April), 1962 (October). While 
information for 1959 was obtained from InterAmerican Development Bank and 
Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, Estudio sobre Política Fiscal en Argentina, 
volumes I-VII, Buenos Aires (1967). 
The data for 1953, 1959 and 1961 which do not come from tax statistics 
(as pointed out in the main text and in the tables) correspond to Consejo 
Nacional de Desarrollo, Distribución del Ingreso y Cuentas Nacionales en la 
Argentina-Investigación Conjunta CONADE-CEPAL, volumes I-V, Buenos Aires 
(1965). This study attempted to measure, for the whole economy, the distribution 
of income in 1953, 1959 and 1961 using a variety of sources, including national 
accounts, banking sector balance sheets, the 1963 income and expenditure 
survey and income tax statistics as the ones used in this paper. Consequently, 
the source of information for those years is not restricted to tax tabulations. 
The information for 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1973 was obtained from 
Dirección General Impositiva, Ministerio de Economía, Estadísticas Tributarias 
Ejercicios 1972/73 and Departamento de Estudios, División Estadística, 
Ministerio de Economía, 1973, Boletín Estadístico Número Especial, Aporte de la 
DGI a las III Jornadas Tributarias del Colegio de Graduados de Ciencias 
Económicas de Buenos Aires. 
More detailed data describe the evolution of the income and wealth taxes 
between 1997 and 2004: Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos, Ministerio 
de Economía, Estadísticas Tributarias 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005. 
 
 
B.2. Total number of tax units 
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The income tax in Argentina has never allowed joint filing for married 
couples. Consequently, the reference total for tax units, defined as the number of 
individuals had everybody been required to file, is computed as the number of 
persons in the Argentine population aged 20 and over. These series are based 
on census linear interpolations and reported in Table 2, column [2]. National 
censuses were conducted in 1914, 1947, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2001. 
Column [3] indicates the total number of tax returns actually filled as well as the 
fraction of the adult population filing a tax return (Column [3]). 
Comisión Nacional del Censo, Tercer censo nacional: levantado el 1 de 
junio de 1914, ordenado por la Ley no. 9108 bajo la presidencia del Dr. Roque 
Saenz Pena, ejecutado durante la presidencia del Dr. Victorino de la Plaza, 
Buenos Aires (1919); Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, IV Censo 
General de Población 1947, Buenos Aires (1951); Dirección Nacional de 
Estadística y Censos, Censo General de Población 1960, Buenos Aires (1965); 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Censo Nacional de Población y 
Vivienda 1991. Resultados definitivos, Total del país, Serie B n° 25, Buenos 
Aires (1993); Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Censo Nacional de 
Población, Hogares y Vivienda 2001, Resultados Generales Total del País, 
Buenos Aires. 
 
B.3. Income and Prices  
 
Income: To relate the amounts recorded in the tax tabulations to a comparable 
reference income, we tried to build up the series of personal income from the 
national accounts. Information comes from the National Accounts System 1993. 
Starting from total GDP, minus indirect and direct taxes not paid by families, 
minus depreciation, minus employers’ social security contributions, minus 
imputed rents on owner-occupied houses, minus financial intermediation services 
consumed by the public sector, minus undistributed profits, plus social transfers 
minus interest paid by the financial system (interest is not included in tax 
statistics), minus 33% of unincorporated profits. This procedure generates a 
reference income of 60% of GDP for recent years. The level of desegregation of 
information required to compute income is not available for all the years. 
Consequently we applied the 60% factor to the GDP in current prices taken from 
Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos (2002), based on information from 
Secretaría de Política Económica, Banco Central de la República Argentina and 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos.61 
As pointed out in Atkinson (2005), given the increasing significance of items such 
as employers’ contributions, non-household institutions such as pension funds 
and public transfers, it is not evident that a constant percentage computed on 
recent information is appropriate to describe the situation during the first half of 
the century. 
 
                                                
61 In the case of Spain the reference total income also turns out to be roughly equal to 60% of 
GDP with deviations of less than 1% (see Alvaredo and Saez (2006)). 
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Prices: The first official consumer price index dates back to 1943. The CPI is 
published monthly by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. The annual index was 
computed as the arithmetic average of monthly indices from 1943 to 2004. For 
1935-1942, the price index was taken from Vazquez Presedo (1971) column [1], 
Table V-2.15; for 1932-1934 it corresponds to Della Paolera and Taylor (2001), 
chapter 13.  
 
B.4. Household Surveys 
 
Household surveys correspond to Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), 
October, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos.  
The last two columns of Table 5 are based on the October 1997 EPH (all urban 
centers). We proceeded in the following way. We corrected the October 1997 
survey weights so that the adult population covered by the survey matches our 
reference total for tax units. As survey income refers to monthly values, annual 
income was computed by up scaling dependent labor income and pensions by a 
factor of 13 (twelve months plus a year-end bonus). Income from all other 
sources was multiplied by 12. Family deductions established by the tax schedule 
were calculated using the household composition information. Deduction for 
spouse was $2,400; deduction for each dependent was $1,200. Personal 
allowance was $4,800. Since other allowances permitted by law vary according 
to personal characteristics, expenses, and sources of income, it is not possible to 
know exactly the individual amount to be deducted. We computed the ratio 
allowances/income by brackets from the tax tabulations, and applied them to 
survey incomes. Individuals with taxable income below 0 were eliminated. The 
remaining individuals were organized by levels of income so as to make the 
comparison with the tax tabulations. 
To adjust the survey incomes so that aggregated income matches the National 
Accounts counterpart, the following factors were applied: wages and salaries, 
1.4; pensions, 1.05; profits, 5.5; entrepreneurs (including self employment), 1.2. 
These correction factors result from comparing aggregated wages, pensions, 
self-employment income, dividends and rents from the national accounts to the 
corresponding totals in the survey. 
 
C. Estimating Top Shares 
 
C.1. Basic Pareto Interpolation 
 
The general interpolation technique is based on the well known empirical 
regularity that the top tail of the income distribution is very closely approximated 
by a Pareto distribution. A Pareto distribution has a cumulative distribution 
function of the form F(y)=1-(k/y)a where k and a are constants, and a is the 
Pareto parameter of the distribution. Such a distribution has the key property that 
the average income above a given threshold y is always exactly proportional to y. 
The coefficient of proportionality is equal to b=a/(a-1). 
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The first step consists then in estimating the income thresholds 
corresponding to each of the percentiles P90, P95, P99, …, P99.99, that define 
our top income groups. For each percentile p, we look first for the published 
income bracket [s,t] containing the percentile p. We estimate then the parameters 
a and k of the Pareto distribution by solving the two equations:  k=s p(1/a) and k=t 
q(1/a) where p is the fraction of tax returns above s and q the fraction of tax returns 
above t.62 Pareto parameters k and a may vary from bracket to bracket. Once the 
density distribution on [s,t] is estimated, it is possible to estimate the income 
threshold, yp, corresponding to targeted percentile p. 
 The second step consists of estimating the amounts of income reported 
above income threshold yp. We estimate the amount reported between income yp 
and t (the upper bound of the published bracket [s,t] containing yp) using the 
estimated Pareto density with parameters a and k. We then add to that amount 
the amounts in all the published brackets above t.  
 Once the total amount above yp is obtained, we obtain directly the mean 
income above percentile p by dividing the amount by the number of individuals 
above percentile p. Finally, the share of income accruing to individuals above 
percentile p is obtained by dividing the total amount above yp by our income 
denominator series. Average incomes and income shares for intermediate 
fractiles (P90-95, P95-99, etc.) are obtained by subtraction. 
The composition for 2001-2004 is estimated from the published tables in 
indicating for each income bracket not only the number of taxpayers and the total 
amount of their total income but also the separate amounts for each type of 
income as well as the deductions. The composition of income within each group 
was estimated from these tables using a simple linear interpolation method. Such 
a method is less satisfactory than the Pareto interpolation method used to 
estimate top income levels (no obvious law seems to fit composition patterns in a 
stable way). See Piketty and Saez (2003) for a more precise discussion of this 
method where it is systematically compared with direct estimates using micro 
data. 
 
 
                                                
62 This is the standard method of Pareto interpolation used by Kuznets (1953) and Feenberg and 
Poterba (1993). 
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FIGURE 1.
Average Real Income and Consumer Price Index in Argentina, 1932-2004
Figure reports the average real income per adult (aged 20 and above), expressed in 2000 US Dollars.
CPI index is equal to 100 in 2000 (logarithmic scale).
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FIGURE 2
The Top 1% ,Top 0.5% and Top 0.1% Income Shares in Argentina, 1932-2004
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FIGURE 3
The Top 1% Income Shares in Argentina and the United States
Source: Argentina: author's calculations. US: Piketty and Saez (2003)
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FIGURE 4
The Top 0.1% Income Shares in Argentina, the United States
France and UK
Source: Argentina: author's calculations. US: Piketty and Saez (2003)
France: Piketty (2001); UK: Atkinson (2005).
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FIGURE 5
The Top 0.01% Income Shares in Argentina and the United States
Source: Argentina: author's calculations. US: Piketty and Saez (2003)
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
5.0%
19
16
19
21
19
26
19
31
19
36
19
41
19
46
19
51
19
56
19
61
19
66
19
71
19
76
19
81
19
86
19
91
19
96
20
01
In
co
m
e 
Sh
ar
e
Argentina Top 0.01%-adjusted
Argentina Top 0.01%
US Top 0.01%
Notes: It covers 1.7%-2.6% of top income earners between 1932 and 1949, 
and 3.7%-5.2% between 1950 and 1958. See Table 2, colum [4].
FIGURE 6
Composition of Reported Income in Argentina, 1932-1958
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FIGURE 7
The Top 0.01% Income Share in Argentina and Top Marginal Rates, 1932-2004
Source: Top 0.01% income share from Table 6.
Top Marginal tax rate is from Table 2, Column [9].
Top 0.01% income share excludes realized capital gains.
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FIGURE 8
The Top 1% Income Share in Argentina and share of Wages in GDP, 1932-2004
Source: Top 1% income share from Table 6.
Share of Wages on GDP from Lindemboin et al (2005)
Income does not include realized capital gains.
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FIGURE 9
Gini Coefficient 1980-2004 Greater Buenos Aires
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FIGURE 10
The Top 0.01% Income Share and Unemployment Rate in Argentina, 1932-2004
Income does not include realized capital gains.
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Social Property Sales International Other Taxes
Personal Corporate Total Contributions Taxes Tax Trade
Income Tax Income Tax (1)+(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1932 6.04 0.12 6.16 15.97 1.53 24.48 40.70 11.16
1933 5.97 2.31 8.28 14.99 1.42 25.01 40.35 9.95
1934 7.18 1.30 8.48 14.89 1.74 26.03 38.84 10.01
1935 6.74 2.64 9.38 14.08 1.67 30.89 35.22 8.76
1936 7.88 1.06 8.94 14.34 2.08 32.78 33.09 8.76
1937 8.17 2.01 10.18 12.92 1.55 31.91 36.58 6.86
1938 7.39 4.81 12.20 13.41 1.68 32.50 33.58 6.63
1939 8.08 4.90 12.98 14.13 1.66 34.72 29.39 7.12
1940 8.09 5.66 13.75 15.36 1.51 36.43 25.55 7.41
1941 11.10 2.85 13.95 16.05 2.15 39.17 20.88 7.79
1942 13.73 4.63 18.36 15.95 2.25 39.07 17.01 7.36
1943 19.33 11.01 30.34 15.54 2.31 35.70 9.78 6.33
1944 18.59 10.50 29.09 16.09 2.38 36.69 7.97 7.78
1945 15.96 8.64 24.60 27.39 1.63 31.84 7.50 7.05
1946 16.82 17.08 33.90 23.80 1.74 24.94 9.96 5.66
1947 15.78 12.57 28.35 32.38 1.07 20.31 13.30 4.60
1948 15.08 12.36 27.44 36.09 1.16 20.44 9.45 5.42
1949 13.92 10.80 24.72 38.08 0.90 26.98 4.55 4.77
1950 16.51 8.27 24.78 34.61 4.86 28.91 3.40 3.44
1951 15.08 9.67 24.75 31.98 3.20 31.78 5.19 3.09
1952 12.03 15.29 27.32 32.21 3.64 30.82 3.11 2.91
1953 11.74 10.61 22.35 35.33 4.49 32.49 1.78 3.56
1954 11.40 9.72 21.12 37.21 4.23 32.65 2.27 2.53
1955 10.91 10.50 21.41 37.54 3.64 31.40 2.75 3.26
1956 12.39 11.86 24.25 37.87 2.61 28.67 2.87 3.74
1957 15.78 8.53 24.31 33.32 1.78 31.53 3.42 5.65
1958 18.05 7.50 25.55 32.75 1.95 30.82 4.35 4.58
1959 16.06 10.44 26.50 34.05 1.48 27.37 6.51 4.11
1960 10.43 14.65 25.08 29.10 5.69 32.36 4.18 3.59
1961 23.28 31.66 4.30 33.59 3.58 3.59
1962 19.43 29.01 3.10 33.44 12.07 2.95
1963 17.84 28.42 2.39 34.67 13.64 3.03
1964 14.59 34.86 1.97 28.72 17.22 2.64
1965 19.95 30.89 1.89 29.41 14.67 3.20
1966 19.83 27.27 3.86 34.44 11.62 2.98
1967 17.54 30.83 5.34 28.27 15.28 2.74
1968 14.79 30.30 4.72 33.61 13.43 3.15
1969 15.23 28.86 4.88 34.16 13.34 3.52
1970 5.80 12.73 18.53 28.59 6.01 31.90 11.87 3.10
1971 6.00 8.15 14.14 32.19 5.59 32.50 12.74 2.84
1972 5.61 7.33 12.95 29.93 4.85 31.80 17.82 2.66
1973 4.70 9.04 13.74 33.84 5.08 29.28 15.11 2.95
1974 14.99 32.37 4.57 33.06 11.99 3.03
1975 8.21 39.36 0.51 35.35 13.83 2.73
1976 9.25 30.59 4.67 31.01 17.92 6.57
1977 11.80 24.07 6.07 38.76 10.51 8.80
1978 11.15 27.57 5.39 44.23 7.95 3.72
1979 7.83 31.16 4.89 44.12 8.97 3.03
1980 9.17 29.35 4.70 43.79 10.21 2.77
1981 10.62 15.77 5.12 54.75 11.51 2.23
1982 9.53 13.76 8.47 54.36 11.75 2.15
1983 7.49 14.84 7.08 49.69 16.62 4.28
1984 4.26 19.77 6.39 51.43 14.29 3.87
1985 6.00 22.33 6.92 43.80 18.40 2.56
1986 7.79 21.10 8.37 45.10 15.07 2.56
1987 9.84 24.51 8.42 41.03 12.09 4.12
1988 8.90 20.89 12.42 43.01 10.19 4.60
1989 10.39 14.76 12.56 34.16 22.86 5.27
1990 4.82 22.31 9.08 44.98 13.06 5.75
1991 4.54 23.76 12.16 46.62 6.43 6.50
1992 7.63 23.48 4.92 53.93 6.12 3.93
1993 11.15 24.34 1.78 52.86 6.41 3.47
1994 12.86 29.71 1.43 47.55 6.18 2.27
1995 14.62 27.45 1.21 49.94 4.42 2.36
1996 15.74 23.62 1.84 53.22 5.25 0.33
1997 3.60 13.52 17.12 21.78 1.26 53.92 5.77 0.14
1998 3.54 15.36 18.90 20.50 1.77 52.93 5.60 0.29
1999 3.41 17.40 20.81 19.29 2.10 52.04 4.84 0.91
2000 4.11 18.61 22.72 18.10 2.47 51.75 4.14 0.83
2001 3.40 19.87 23.27 17.76 8.25 46.27 3.64 0.82
2002 5.32 13.04 18.36 16.02 10.58 42.17 12.26 0.61
2003 5.24 16.65 21.89 13.41 10.36 38.62 15.35 0.38
2004 4.26 19.20 23.46 13.29 9.48 39.72 13.53 0.51
Source: Dirección General de Impuestos a los Réditos, Memoria, several years; Dirección General Impositiva, Memoria,
several years; Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos, Estadísticas Tributarias, several years.
Personal Income Tax and Corporate Tax
% of National Government Tax Receipts
TABLE 1A. Structure of Tax Revenues. Argentina 1932-2004
Social Property Sales International Other Taxes
Personal Corporate Total Contributions Taxes Tax Trade
Income Tax Income Tax (1)+(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1932 0.61 0.01 0.62 1.62 0.16 2.48 4.12 1.13
1933 0.58 0.22 0.80 1.46 0.14 2.43 3.92 0.97
1934 0.64 0.12 0.76 1.34 0.16 2.33 3.48 0.90
1935 0.68 0.27 0.94 1.42 0.17 3.11 3.54 0.88
1936 0.74 0.10 0.84 1.34 0.19 3.07 3.10 0.82
1937 0.77 0.19 0.96 1.22 0.15 3.00 3.44 0.65
1938 0.73 0.48 1.21 1.33 0.17 3.23 3.34 0.66
1939 0.76 0.46 1.22 1.33 0.16 3.26 2.76 0.67
1940 0.72 0.50 1.22 1.37 0.13 3.24 2.27 0.66
1941 0.88 0.23 1.11 1.28 0.17 3.11 1.66 0.62
1942 1.05 0.35 1.40 1.21 0.17 2.98 1.30 0.56
1943 1.63 0.93 2.56 1.31 0.19 3.02 0.83 0.54
1944 1.58 0.89 2.47 1.37 0.20 3.12 0.68 0.66
1945 1.49 0.81 2.30 2.56 0.15 2.97 0.70 0.66
1946 1.87 1.90 3.77 2.65 0.19 2.77 1.11 0.63
1947 2.19 1.75 3.94 4.49 0.15 2.82 1.85 0.64
1948 2.24 1.84 4.08 5.37 0.17 3.04 1.41 0.81
1949 2.14 1.66 3.80 5.86 0.14 4.15 0.70 0.73
1950 2.85 1.43 4.27 5.97 0.84 4.99 0.59 0.59
1951 2.59 1.66 4.26 5.50 0.55 5.47 0.89 0.53
1952 1.90 2.41 4.30 5.07 0.57 4.85 0.49 0.46
1953 1.84 1.67 3.51 5.54 0.70 5.10 0.28 0.56
1954 1.91 1.63 3.54 6.23 0.71 5.47 0.38 0.42
1955 1.73 1.67 3.40 5.97 0.58 5.00 0.44 0.52
1956 1.98 1.89 3.87 6.04 0.42 4.58 0.46 0.60
1957 2.13 1.15 3.28 4.49 0.24 4.25 0.46 0.76
1958 2.20 0.91 3.11 3.98 0.24 3.75 0.53 0.56
1959 1.93 1.25 3.18 4.08 0.18 3.28 0.78 0.49
1960 1.25 1.76 3.01 3.49 0.68 3.88 0.50 0.43
1961 2.83 3.84 0.52 4.08 0.44 0.44
1962 2.12 3.17 0.34 3.65 1.32 0.32
1963 2.08 3.32 0.28 4.05 1.59 0.35
1964 1.54 3.68 0.21 3.03 1.82 0.28
1965 2.31 3.58 0.22 3.41 1.70 0.37
1966 2.50 3.43 0.49 4.33 1.46 0.37
1967 2.54 4.47 0.77 4.10 2.22 0.40
1968 1.99 4.08 0.64 4.53 1.81 0.42
1969 1.94 3.68 0.62 4.35 1.70 0.45
1970 0.92 2.02 2.94 4.54 0.95 5.07 1.89 0.49
1971 0.84 1.15 1.99 4.53 0.79 4.57 1.79 0.40
1972 0.70 0.91 1.61 3.73 0.60 3.96 2.22 0.33
1973 0.62 1.19 1.81 4.47 0.67 3.86 1.99 0.39
1974 2.35 5.08 0.72 5.19 1.88 0.48
1975 0.88 4.21 0.05 3.78 1.48 0.29
1976 1.18 3.90 0.59 3.95 2.28 0.84
1977 1.39 2.84 0.71 4.57 1.24 1.04
1978 1.31 3.24 0.63 5.19 0.93 0.44
1979 0.89 3.54 0.56 5.02 1.02 0.34
1980 1.16 3.72 0.60 5.55 1.29 0.35
1981 1.24 1.84 0.60 6.37 1.34 0.26
1982 0.95 1.37 0.84 5.40 1.17 0.21
1983 0.70 1.38 0.66 4.62 1.55 0.40
1984 0.40 1.84 0.59 4.78 1.33 0.36
1985 0.76 2.82 0.87 5.53 2.32 0.32
1986 0.95 2.58 1.02 5.51 1.84 0.31
1987 1.19 2.97 1.02 4.97 1.46 0.50
1988 0.94 2.21 1.31 4.54 1.08 0.49
1989 1.21 1.72 1.46 3.98 2.66 0.61
1990 0.51 2.38 0.97 4.80 1.39 0.61
1991 0.58 3.06 1.57 6.00 0.83 0.84
1992 1.14 3.51 0.74 8.07 0.92 0.59
1993 1.84 4.02 0.29 8.74 1.06 0.57
1994 2.30 5.30 0.25 8.49 1.10 0.40
1995 2.46 4.62 0.20 8.40 0.74 0.40
1996 2.54 3.82 0.30 8.60 0.85 0.05
1997 0.61 2.28 2.89 3.68 0.21 9.10 0.97 0.02
1998 0.60 2.61 3.21 3.48 0.30 8.98 0.95 0.05
1999 0.58 2.97 3.56 3.30 0.36 8.90 0.83 0.16
2000 0.72 3.25 3.97 3.17 0.43 9.05 0.72 0.14
2001 0.58 3.41 3.99 3.05 1.42 7.94 0.62 0.14
2002 0.88 2.16 3.05 2.66 1.76 6.99 2.03 0.10
2003 1.03 3.27 4.30 2.63 2.04 7.59 3.02 0.07
2004 0.96 4.31 5.27 2.98 2.13 8.92 3.04 0.11
Source: Dirección General de Impuestos a los Réditos, Memoria, several years; Dirección General Impositiva, Memoria,
several years; Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos, Estadísticas Tributarias.
Personal Income Tax and Corporate Tax
TABLE 1B. Structure of Tax Revenues. Argentina 1932-2004
National Government Tax Receipts as % of GDP
Price Index Inflation Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Population Tax Number of (3)/(2) Total income Average income CPI Top Marginal
Units tax returns (%) (million (2000 US Dollars) (2000:100) (%) Tax Rate
('000s) ('000s) ('000s) 2000 US Dollars) (%)
1932 11,570 6,372 113 1.8 25,927 4,069 1.51E-12 -10.3 12
1933 11,817 6,538 112 1.7 25,149 3,847 1.64E-12 8.2 12
1934 12,070 6,708 133 2.0 25,854 3,854 1.51E-12 -7.6 12
1935 12,328 6,883 142 2.1 27,454 3,989 1.60E-12 6.0 12
1936 12,592 7,063 150 2.1 28,205 3,993 1.74E-12 8.5 12
1937 12,861 7,247 151 2.1 28,439 3,924 1.78E-12 2.6 12
1938 13,137 7,436 145 2.0 30,500 4,102 1.77E-12 -0.6 12
1939 13,418 7,630 142 1.9 30,595 4,010 1.80E-12 1.5 12
1940 13,705 7,829 134 1.7 31,766 4,057 1.84E-12 2.2 12
1941 13,998 8,033 147 1.8 32,280 4,018 1.89E-12 2.6 12
1942 14,297 8,242 122 1.5 33,965 4,121 2.00E-12 5.7 12
1943 14,603 8,457 141 1.7 34,340 4,061 2.02E-12 1.1 25
1944 14,916 8,678 167 1.9 34,108 3,930 2.01E-12 -0.3 25
1945 15,235 8,904 180 2.0 37,949 4,262 2.41E-12 19.8 25
1946 15,561 9,136 189 2.1 36,730 4,020 2.83E-12 17.6 27
1947 15,894 9,375 221 2.4 40,013 4,268 3.22E-12 13.6 27
1948 16,178 9,562 250 2.6 44,460 4,650 3.64E-12 13.1 27
1949 16,468 9,754 255 2.6 46,899 4,808 4.77E-12 31.1 27
1950 16,762 9,949 365 3.7 46,289 4,653 5.99E-12 25.6 27
1951 17,062 10,148 386 3.8 46,850 4,617 8.19E-12 36.7 27
1952 17,367 10,352 476 4.6 48,675 4,702 1.14E-11 38.7 32
1953 17,678 10,559 558 5.3 46,224 4,378 1.18E-11 4.0 32
1954 17,994 10,770 545 5.1 48,671 4,519 1.23E-11 3.8 32
1955 18,316 10,986 n/a n/a 50,682 4,613 1.38E-11 12.3 40
1956 18,644 11,206 587 5.2 54,263 4,842 1.56E-11 13.4 40
1957 18,977 11,430 n/a n/a 55,769 4,879 1.95E-11 24.7 40
1958 19,317 11,659 605 5.2 58,658 5,031 2.56E-11 31.6 40
1959 19,662 11,893 491 4.1 62,240 5,233 5.47E-11 113.7 40
1960 20,014 12,131 n/a n/a 58,218 4,799 6.93E-11 26.6 40
1961 20,326 8,402 n/a n/a 42,748 5,088 7.88E-11 13.7 40
1970 23,362 14,438 591 4.1 89,606 6,206 4.76E-10 13.6 46
1971 23,785 14,686 551 3.8 94,426 6,430 6.41E-10 34.7 46
1972 24,215 14,939 532 3.6 98,941 6,623 1.02E-09 58.5 46
1973 24,653 15,196 494 3.3 102,032 6,714 1.63E-09 60.3 46
1997 34,756 22,403 1,259 5.6 157,207 7,017 101.20 0.5 33
1998 35,126 22,869 1,114 4.9 169,951 7,432 102.14 0.9 33
1999 35,500 23,346 819 3.5 176,498 7,560 100.95 -1.2 33
2000 35,878 23,833 786 3.3 170,526 7,155 100.00 -0.9 35
2001 36,260 24,329 674 2.8 163,003 6,700 98.93 -1.1 35
2002 36,646 24,836 728 2.9 145,245 5,848 124.53 25.9 35
2003 37,037 25,354 763 3.0 158,083 6,235 141.27 13.4 35
2004 37,431 25,882 748 2.9 172,308 6,657 147.49 4.4 35
Notes: Population and tax units estimates based on census.
Tax units estimated as number of adults aged 20 and over.
Total Income 
TABLE 2. Reference Totals for Population, Income and Inflation, 1932-2004
Tax Units and Population
Percentile 
threshold
Income 
threshold
Income 
Groups
Number of 
adults (aged 
20+)
Average 
income in 
each group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Adult 
Population 23,833,000 $7,155
Top 1% $33,935 Top 1-0.5% 119,165 $44,511
Top 0.5% $58,940 Top 0.5-0.1% 95,332 $90,630
Top 0.1% $163,468 Top 0.1-0.01% 21,450 $282,252
Top 0.01% $665,964 Top 0.01% 2,383 $1,402,012
Notes: Computations based on income tax return statistics. 
Amounts are expressed in 2000 US Dollars. 
Column (2) reports the income thresholds corresponding to each of the percentiles in column (1). For example,
an annual income of at least $163,468 is required to belong to the top 0.1% tax units, etc.
Thresholds and Average Incomes in Top Income Groups in 2000
TABLE 3A.
adjusted for under-reporting
Percentile 
threshold
Income 
threshold
Income 
Groups
Number of 
adults (aged 
20+)
Average 
income in 
each group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Adult 
Population 23,833,000 $7,155
Top 1% $51,921 Top 1-0.5% 119,165 $68,102
Top 0.5% $90,178 Top 0.5-0.1% 95,332 $138,665
Top 0.1% $250,106 Top 0.1-0.01% 21,450 $431,846
Top 0.01% $1,018,924 Top 0.01% 2,383 $2,145,079
Notes: Computations based on income tax return statistics. 
Amounts are expressed in 2000 US Dollars. 
Column (2) reports the income thresholds corresponding to each of the percentiles in column (1). For example,
an annual income of at least $250,106 is required to belong to the top 0.1% tax units, etc.
Incomes adjusted for under-reporting as described in text.
Thresholds and Average Incomes in Top Income Groups in 2000
TABLE 3B.
(from to) (from to)
30,000 6,667 33
30,001 40,000 6,667 8,889 34
40,001 60,000 8,889 13,333 36
60,001 90,000 13,334 20,000 38
90,001 120,000 20,000 26,667 39
120,001 200,000 26,667 44,444 40
200,001 300,000 44,445 66,667 40
300,001 700,000 66,667 155,556 36
700,001 2,000,000 155,556 444,444 31
2,000,001 444,445 27
Source: Presidencia de la Nación (1967), volume V
Notes: m$n refers to 'pesos moneda nacional', the legal currency in 1959
(% of reported income)
in 1959 m$n
TABLE 4. Under-reporting in Income Tax. 1959
Income Levels
in 2000 US Dollars un-reported income
Income Brackets
in 1997 US Dollars # th.US Dollars # th. US Dollars
10,000  356,793  2,002,216  278,573  2,520,039  
10,000  20,000  359,544  5,219,874  1,084,653  15,600,000  
20,000  30,000  198,613  4,877,585  327,086  8,131,826  
30,000  40,000  113,129  3,914,582  117,165  4,139,473  
40,000  50,000  68,388  3,054,019  42,057  1,882,858  
50,000  60,000  42,882  2,344,636  21,110  1,158,234  
60,000  80,000  48,631  3,350,531  19,238  1,329,835  
80,000  100,000  26,136  2,329,231  8,196  732,496  
100,000  150,000  23,466  2,818,377  3,834  428,004  
150,000  200,000  8,555  1,467,866  976  152,213  
200,000  300,000  6,616  1,596,016  
300,000  500,000  3,849  1,455,500  1,345  487,354  
500,000  1,000,000  1,895  1,259,405  160  115,200  
1,000,000  1,500,000  411  488,769  
1,500,000  2,000,000  181  337,018  
2,000,000  3,000,000  31  85,207  
3,000,000  5,000,000  49  186,703  
5,000,000  26  226,908  
Total 1,259,195  37,014,443  1,904,393  36,677,531  
Source: AFIP, Estadísticas Tributarias 1998 and EPH October 1997.
Tax Statistics Survey Statistics
TABLE 5. Income Tax Tabulation and Household Survey 1997
Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top .1% Top .01% Top 5-1% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-.01% Top .01%
(2) (3) (5) (6) (8) (9) (11) (12)
A. Results from tax statistics
1932 20.85 16.21 8.35 2.77 4.65 7.85 5.58 2.77
1933 19.09 14.83 7.55 2.65 4.25 7.28 4.90 2.65
1934 20.06 15.58 8.09 2.72 4.48 7.49 5.37 2.72
1935 20.49 15.91 8.23 2.77 4.58 7.68 5.46 2.77
1936 22.67 17.29 8.62 2.74 5.36 5.38 8.68 5.88 2.74
1937 22.71 17.61 9.01 2.89 5.11 8.59 6.12 2.89
1938 22.74 17.59 9.00 2.87 5.15 8.60 6.13 2.87
1939 23.21 18.03 9.27 3.02 5.18 8.76 6.24 3.02
1940 22.34 17.54 9.17 2.95 4.80 8.37 6.22 2.95
1941 24.92 19.83 10.49 3.44 5.09 9.34 7.06 3.44
1942 26.41 21.93 12.64 4.64 4.49 9.29 8.00 4.64
1943 28.84 23.22 12.91 4.62 5.63 10.30 8.29 4.62
1944 27.50 21.85 11.81 4.03 5.65 10.04 7.78 4.03
1945 25.98 20.38 10.84 3.68 5.60 9.54 7.16 3.68
1946 25.15 19.96 10.88 3.85 5.19 9.08 7.03 3.85
1947 26.69 21.17 11.68 4.13 5.52 9.49 7.55 4.13
1948 25.80 20.34 10.86 3.55 5.46 9.47 7.31 3.55
1949 21.49 16.79 8.75 2.66 4.70 8.05 6.08 2.66
1950 22.01 17.28 9.06 2.87 4.73 8.22 6.19 2.87
1951 18.84 14.73 7.61 2.38 4.12 7.12 5.23 2.38
1952 13.85 10.25 4.84 1.36 3.60 5.41 3.48 1.36
1953 24.22 12.79 9.34 4.27 1.19 11.43 3.46 5.07 3.08 1.19
1954 25.24 13.79 10.27 4.87 1.42 11.45 3.51 5.40 3.45 1.42
1956 24.14 13.05 9.71 4.52 1.28 11.09 3.34 5.19 3.24 1.28
1959 13.55 10.27 5.09 1.54 3.28 5.18 3.55 1.54
1970 13.53 8.51 2.89 0.56 5.02 5.62 2.33 0.56
1971 11.98 7.69 2.63 0.64 4.29 5.07 1.98 0.64
1972 10.48 6.74 2.39 0.61 3.75 4.35 1.78 0.61
1973 8.22 5.60 2.27 0.60 2.62 3.33 1.67 0.60
1997 20.12 11.78 8.60 4.11 1.37 8.34 3.18 4.49 2.74 1.37
1998 12.02 8.92 4.37 1.50 3.10 4.55 2.86 1.50
1999 14.55 11.12 5.71 2.00 3.43 5.41 3.71 2.00
2000 13.69 10.58 5.51 1.96 3.11 5.07 3.55 1.96
2001 12.28 9.60 5.02 1.80 2.68 4.58 3.22 1.80
2002 14.07 11.26 6.29 2.46 2.81 4.97 3.83 2.46
2003 15.34 12.38 6.98 2.67 2.96 5.41 4.30 2.67
2004 14.44 11.89 6.73 2.47 2.55 5.16 4.26 2.47
B. Results from other sources and adjusted for under-reporting
1953(a) 28.64 14.31 10.74 4.91 1.36 14.32 3.57 5.83 3.55 1.36
1959(a) 33.79 17.69 12.82 5.81 1.55 16.10 4.87 7.01 4.26 1.55
1959(b) 18.40 13.81 6.62 1.96
1961(a) 31.12 16.31 12.01 5.45 1.62 14.80 4.30 6.56 3.84 1.62
1970 18.00 11.31 3.84 0.75 6.68 7.47 3.10 0.75
1971 15.94 10.23 3.49 0.86 5.71 6.74 2.64 0.86
1972 13.94 8.96 3.18 0.81 4.98 5.79 2.36 0.81
1973 10.93 7.45 3.02 0.80 3.49 4.43 2.22 0.80
1997 30.77 18.03 13.16 6.29 2.10 12.74 4.87 6.87 4.19 2.10
1998 18.38 13.64 6.68 2.30 4.75 6.96 4.38 2.30
1999 22.27 17.02 8.74 3.06 5.25 8.28 5.68 3.06
2000 20.94 16.18 8.43 3.00 4.76 7.75 5.43 3.00
2001 18.79 14.69 7.69 2.76 4.10 7.00 4.93 2.76
2002 21.53 17.22 9.62 3.77 4.31 7.60 5.86 3.77
2003 23.47 18.94 10.67 4.09 4.53 8.27 6.58 4.09
2004 22.10 18.19 10.29 3.77 3.91 7.90 6.52 3.77
Notes: Taxpayers are ranked by gross income.
The Table reports the percentage of total income accruing to each of the top groups. Top 1% denotes top percentile, 
Income does not include capital gains.
Panel A displays the estimates from tax statistics.
Panel B displays the results according to ECLAC/CONADE (1953(a), 1959(a) and 1961(a)) 
and according to adjustments for evation (1959(b), 1970-1973 and 1997-2004).
Table 6. Top Income Shares in Argentina, 1932-2004
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Argentina 54.40 54.65 54.41 54.56 53.80 55.74 57.56 55.91 58.00 57.91 59.85 60.13 60.47 59.86
Germany 1.13 1.20 1.15 1.16 0.97 1.18 1.24 1.20 1.28 1.30 1.35 1.36 1.28 1.22
Belgium 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.13
Spain 14.27 14.36 14.39 14.58 14.90 15.53 14.63 14.56 14.68 13.86 12.51 12.59 12.69 11.79
United States 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.37
France 2.25 2.16 1.99 1.88 1.82 1.90 1.76 1.72 1.76 1.49 1.62 1.56 1.48 1.36
United Kingdom 1.61 1.73 1.52 1.49 1.29 1.44 1.41 1.39 1.55 1.37 1.53 1.42 1.34 1.25
Italy 13.92 13.42 13.40 12.86 14.61 13.65 13.10 11.01 11.41 9.79 9.57 9.37 9.20 10.70
URSS 0.95 0.99 1.02 1.04 1.03 1.17 1.13 1.12 1.15 1.22 1.18 1.22 1.21 1.23
Syria 1.04 1.05 1.20 1.30 1.34 1.34 1.33 1.32 1.37 1.39 1.34 1.31 1.30 1.15
Switzerland 0.53 0.54 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.46
Uruguay 1.23 1.19 1.14 1.09 1.01 1.10 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.03 1.10 1.04 0.99 0.88
Other 2.35 2.56 2.77 3.21 3.22 3.48 3.29 3.45 3.60 4.48 4.19 4.71 5.23 5.14
Not determined 5.94 5.65 6.03 5.87 5.11 2.44 2.50 6.28 3.04 5.12 4.59 4.21 3.80 4.46
Argentina 57.51 56.90 56.74 57.94 55.51 58.55 60.31 58.30 59.64 58.15 59.63 60.27 62.69 60.62
Germany 1.13 1.41 1.35 1.34 1.21 1.42 1.46 1.30 1.49 1.25 1.32 1.38 1.23 1.07
Belgium 0.42 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.35 0.45 0.32 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.26
Spain 11.90 12.39 12.75 12.64 13.10 13.74 12.85 12.39 13.17 12.10 11.42 11.44 8.13 11.15
United States 0.57 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.69 0.67 0.81 0.84 0.94 0.95 1.00 0.88 0.74 0.68
France 3.12 3.10 2.70 2.57 2.60 2.69 2.83 2.37 2.59 2.10 1.96 2.13 2.13 1.88
United Kingdom 3.12 3.24 3.06 2.91 2.17 2.46 2.34 2.30 2.74 3.30 2.56 2.42 2.13 1.85
Italy 10.48 10.28 10.05 9.96 12.40 10.98 10.59 8.80 9.17 8.05 8.17 7.72 8.30 7.75
URSS 0.42 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.52 0.67 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.85 0.91 0.96 1.02 1.07
Syria 0.57 0.56 0.86 0.78 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.84 1.10 1.35 1.32 1.25 1.02 1.33
Switzerland 0.85 0.99 0.37 0.56 0.61 0.67 0.81 0.69 0.78 0.65 0.78 0.79 0.90 0.75
Uruguay 1.56 1.41 1.47 1.23 1.39 1.42 1.37 1.38 1.41 1.45 1.37 1.25 1.31 1.20
Other 1.84 2.11 2.45 1.90 2.78 2.99 2.59 2.83 3.29 4.40 4.84 5.05 5.80 5.51
Not determined 6.52 6.06 6.62 6.49 5.81 2.39 2.18 6.96 2.66 5.00 4.29 4.13 4.29 4.89
Source: Dirección Nacional de Impuestos a los Réditos, Memoria, several years.
Note: information for 1941 missing.
Distribution of tax returns by nationality (%)
Distribution of reported income by nationality (%)
TABLE 7. Country of origin of income tax payers 1932-1946
year
survey incomes adjusted for underreporting based on National Accounts
Top 10% Top 1% Top .1%
Wage Business Capital+Rents Wage Business Capital+Rents Wage Business Capital+Rents
1987 61.2 25.8 7.1 61.2 25.8 7.1 31.3 43.4 25.3 6.7 51.4 41.9
1988 59.2 23.5 7.1 59.2 23.5 7.1 34.5 43.5 22.0 8.8 51.6 39.7
1989
1990 57.1 22.3 7.7 57.1 22.3 7.7 40.7 44.5 14.8 10.5 60.9 28.7
1991 61.6 31.3 15.5 61.6 31.3 15.5 32.3 47.1 20.6 7.5 57.0 35.1
1992 59.3 24.7 5.8 59.3 24.7 5.8 30.3 47.4 22.3 2.8 57.7 39.5
1993 57.6 23.0 5.6 57.6 23.0 5.6 28.6 52.7 18.7 5.1 61.7 33.2
1994 58.4 24.3 7.2 58.4 24.3 7.2 32.0 46.5 21.4 8.1 51.7 40.2
1995 61.3 26.1 5.7 61.3 26.1 5.7 29.5 48.0 22.5 5.9 58.5 35.6
1996 60.5 24.2 6.5 60.5 24.2 6.5 30.5 45.0 24.5 5.8 51.7 42.6
1997 60.2 25.3 6.2 60.2 25.3 6.2 28.8 44.8 26.4 5.0 47.7 47.3
1998 58.7 24.4 6.8 58.7 24.4 6.8 29.8 49.4 20.8 3.7 63.2 33.1
1999 59.5 24.1 7.1 59.5 24.1 7.1 33.2 43.2 23.6 5.2 56.7 38.1
2000 60.0 23.5 7.3 60.0 23.5 7.3 33.8 37.4 28.8 4.8 41.6 53.6
2001 61.9 24.5 5.2 61.9 24.5 5.2 34.7 38.4 26.9 5.1 53.1 41.8
2002 56.3 22.9 6.5 56.3 22.9 6.5 39.3 38.1 22.6 6.7 56.1 37.2
2003 56.0 22.6 6.9 56.0 22.6 6.9 35.6 40.3 24.1 4.9 57.2 37.8
survey incomes with no adjustment
Top 10% Top 1% Top .1%
Wage Business Capital+Rents Wage Business Capital+Rents Wage Business Capital+Rents
1987 44.1 11.8 2.1 44.1 11.8 2.1 63.0 33.8 3.2 56.9 37.9 5.2
1988 45.0 11.1 2.3 45.0 11.1 2.3 63.5 34.0 2.5 52.1 42.6 5.3
1989
1990 44.5 12.1 2.7 44.5 12.1 2.7 64.7 33.6 1.5 60.3 37.0 2.6
1991 45.4 13.7 4.5 45.4 13.7 4.5 60.1 37.5 2.7 48.7 45.5 6.0
1992 43.1 10.6 2.1 43.1 10.6 2.1 55.7 41.8 2.6 37.5 57.6 4.9
1993 40.5 10.2 2.0 40.5 10.2 2.0 56.2 41.7 2.1 53.6 43.3 3.1
1994 41.9 10.2 2.3 41.9 10.2 2.3 60.2 36.9 2.9 47.9 46.6 5.5
1995 41.8 12.0 2.4 41.8 12.0 2.4 61.3 36.6 2.1 57.3 41.0 1.7
1996 41.7 11.3 2.4 41.7 11.3 2.4 61.8 35.6 2.6 52.7 42.1 5.2
1997 42.2 9.8 2.3 42.2 9.8 2.3 63.1 33.9 3.0 56.6 37.5 5.9
1998 44.0 10.8 2.0 44.0 10.8 2.0 62.3 35.8 1.8 49.7 47.3 3.1
1999 42.5 9.8 2.0 42.5 9.8 2.0 67.6 30.2 2.3 52.7 42.5 4.8
2000 43.2 10.5 2.0 43.2 10.5 2.0 68.9 28.4 2.8 63.1 32.8 4.2
2001 47.1 10.6 2.0 47.1 10.6 2.0 72.2 25.5 2.3 57.0 39.8 3.2
2002 44.3 11.0 2.3 44.3 11.0 2.3 76.1 22.3 1.6 62.1 35.9 2.1
2003 42.6 10.6 2.2 42.6 10.6 2.2 71.7 26.2 2.1 58.6 38.1 3.3
Notes: Fractiles defined in terms of the number of tax units.
Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1%
Table 8A: Income Shares and Composition in Top
Income Groups based on Household Survey, 1987-2003
Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1%
Table 8B: Income Shares and Composition in Top
Income Groups based on Household Survey, 1987-2003
Rents Capital Business Wages Rents Capital Business Wages Rents Capital Business Wages Rents Capital Business Wages
2001 6.2 10.0 34.7 49.2 5.0 8.5 39.7 46.8 2.5 6.7 54.9 35.9 0.9 7.5 64.8 26.8
2002 5.9 19.7 36.7 37.7 4.5 19.1 43.2 33.3 2.7 16.1 54.4 26.7 1.0 9.9 67.2 21.9
2003 5.3 19.6 41.4 33.6 4.5 19.1 45.2 31.2 2.2 14.9 59.1 23.7 0.7 9.4 69.5 20.4
2004 5.7 19.0 45.0 30.3 4.9 17.8 48.1 29.1 1.9 11.6 63.8 22.7 0.8 9.3 71.2 18.7
Rents Capital Business Wages Rents Capital Business Wages Rents Capital Business Wages Rents Capital Business Wages
2001 10.7 15.9 14.5 58.9 7.6 10.3 24.2 57.9 3.7 6.1 47.7 42.5 0.9 7.5 64.8 26.8
2002 10.8 21.8 14.3 53.1 7.4 24.0 24.3 44.4 3.5 18.9 48.8 28.8 1.0 9.9 67.2 21.9
2003 11.1 23.2 14.6 51.0 7.6 24.8 26.3 41.3 3.1 18.1 53.2 25.6 0.7 9.4 69.5 20.4
2004 13.2 29.1 16.7 40.9 8.8 25.8 28.5 36.9 2.8 13.5 57.8 25.9 0.8 9.3 71.2 18.7
Source: Computations based on income tax return statistics 
Table 9: Composition in Top Income Groups, 2001-2004 
Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-.01% Top 0.01%
Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.01%
